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lately i‘ve been glaring into mirrors 
picking myself apart 
you‘d think at my age I‘d have thought of  
something better to do . . .  
but now here‘s this tiny baby 
and they say she looks just like me  
and she is smiling at me 
with that present/infant glee 
and I would defend 
to the ends of the earth 
her perfect right to be
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
As an attorney for the losing party in Gonzales v. Carhart,
2
 I 
                                               
1 ANI DIFRANCO, Present/Infant, on RED LETTER YEAR (Righteous Babe 
Records 2008). 
2 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (upholding the federal abortion ban, also known as 
the ―Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003‖).  In Carhart, the Court upheld a 
law that prevents a woman from obtaining the intact D&E method of abortion, 
even where the woman‘s doctor believes it is the safest method for her and the 
one that best preserves her ability to bear children in the future, and despite the 
view of the leading medical association of obstetricians and gynecologists that 
intact D&E is the safest procedure for some women. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1644 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Brief of the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
11–16, Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Nos. 05-380, 1382), 2006 WL 
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read the opinion with considerable dread. But when I came to the 
now infamous passage
3
 relying on maternal love to support the 
Court‘s decision, I stopped and shuddered. Justice Kennedy wrote 
for the Court:  
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the 
bond of love the mother has for her child. The Act 
recognizes this reality as well.
4
  
In response to these words, my own bonds of love—desperate, 
animal-like, and imperfect as they are—twanged. Suddenly, our 
failure in the Court became more complete; at the same time, these 
words shed light on the decision and its irrationality.   
The loss in Carhart and the rhetoric the Court employed point 
to a significant vulnerability in the movement for legal protections 
for women‘s reproductive health care—its conflicts over 
motherhood. This Article argues that the movement‘s failure to 
emphasize that abortion serves women‘s interest in, and respect 
for, motherhood divides it from its constituents and creates the 
vulnerability that the anti-abortion movement now exploits, 
contributing to the reduction of constitutional protections for 
abortion. Embracing abortion‘s supportive relationship to 
motherhood is essential to the survival of the abortion right, as well 
as to the vitality of our continuing battle to redefine motherhood in 
conditions of equality.   
In Section I that follows, I explore the ways women‘s respect 
for the importance of motherhood and ―bonds of love‖ with their 
children inform their decisions to obtain abortions. In Section II, I 
                                               
2867888 (detailing significant safety advantages of intact D&E over non-intact 
D&E alternative). 
3 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Adjudging a Moral Harm to Women from 
Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A18 (citing passage and noting that 
―[i]n his majority opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy suggested that a 
pregnant woman who chooses abortion falls away from true womanhood.‖). 
4 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634 (internal citations omitted). The Court 
continued, ―[w]hether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral 
decision.  While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems 
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort 
the infant life they once created and sustained.  Severe depression and loss of 
esteem can follow.‖ Id. 
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summarize the state of abortion jurisprudence, paying particular 
attention to the Court‘s vision of women‘s need for, or ―interest 
in,‖ abortion. I trace the emergence of the Court‘s discomfort with 
women‘s decision-making about abortion, linking it with 
decreasing protections for the right and increasing recognition that 
abortion serves an interest in women‘s social and economic 
equality. I demonstrate that the Court‘s increasing recognition that 
abortion serves an interest in self-determination that could result in 
a rejection of the role of mother, accompanied a decreasing 
recognition of abortion‘s importance to women‘s interests in 
motherhood itself, an interest in how any child they bear is cared 
for. This sense in which abortion serves women‘s interests in 
motherhood was last seen in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, where 
the Court acknowledged that the choice to have an abortion could 
be seen as reflecting ―human responsibility and respect for [human 
life].‖5   
In Section III, I discuss Gonzales v. Carhart and argue that 
while the ruling itself is limited and much of the Casey standard 
remains intact, the decision reflects this diminishing sense of 
abortion as serving the woman‘s interest in motherhood. The 
Court‘s opinion reflected a view that abortion destroys 
motherhood, rather than the view that abortion enhances 
motherhood and enables women to mother their children in the 
best conditions possible, and  in conditions closer to equality. 
Finally, in Section IV I explore resistance in the feminist 
movement to stressing the ways abortion serves a woman‘s interest 
in, and respect for, the importance of motherhood. Despite real 
risks of appealing to and thus supporting regressive notions of 
motherhood, I make both normative and prescriptive claims that 
given the centrality of concerns for motherhood in women‘s 
decision-making about abortion, we must emphasize that women‘s 
interest in abortion in a constitutional sense includes not only her 
interest in her choice not to be a mother (an aspect of her 
decisional autonomy), her interest in her personal dignity,
6
 her 
                                               
5 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852–53 (1992).  
6 See Reva Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion 
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008) (A ―multi-
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interest in her health and life (an aspect of her bodily integrity),
7
 
and her interest in privacy of the information about her decision,
8
 
but also includes her interest in motherhood itself and in deciding 
how she will mother any child she bears. I contend that these 
arguments about why women choose and why women need 
abortions can and should be made within, and not as an alternative 
to, a rights framework. Stressing that abortion serves women‘s 
interest in motherhood in a constitutional sense very clearly falls 
within such a framework, and is necessary to drawing a complete 
                                               
faceted commitment to dignity links Carhart and the Casey decision on which it 
centrally relies,‖ that a ―dignity-based analysis of Casey/Carhart offers 
principles for determining the constitutionality of woman-protective abortion 
restrictions that are grounded in a large body of substantive due process and 
equal protection case law,‖ and that ―protecting women can violate women‘s 
dignity if protection is based on stereotypical assumptions about women‘s 
capacities and women‘s roles, as many of the new woman-protective abortion 
restrictions are.‖) [hereinafter The Politics of Protection]; Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (holding that liberty right protects the ―dignity‖ of gay 
men and lesbians to choose intimate relationships). 
7 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849–50, 857 (―Roe stands at an intersection of two 
lines of decisions‖;  the Constitution limits interference with ―a person‘s most 
basic decisions about family and parenthood‖ and with a person‘s ―bodily 
integrity‖); id. at 857 (Roe ―may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold 
liberty but as a rule . . . of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with 
doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate 
medical treatment or to bar its rejection.‖); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 
211–13 (1973) (contrasting ―freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one‘s 
life‖ with ―freedom to care for one‘s health and person, freedom from bodily 
restraint . . . .‖) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
8 See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 766 (1986), (―The decision to terminate a pregnancy is an intensely private 
one that must be protected in a way that assures anonymity.‖); id. at 767 
(striking Pennsylvania reporting requirements that would have allowed 
identification of women who had obtained abortions, thus ―rais[ing] the specter 
of public exposure and harassment of women who choose to exercise their 
personal, intensely private, right, with their physician, to end a pregnancy‖) 
(citations omitted); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (requiring that 
judicial bypass procedures maintain a minor‘s anonymity); cf. Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976) (upholding reporting 
requirements that were ―reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal 
health and that properly respect a patient‘s confidentiality and privacy‖). 
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picture of the importance of abortion to women‘s liberty, equality, 
and dignity. It strengthens the woman‘s right to abortion and is 
vital to continued protection of the right under any level of scrutiny 
or in any constitutional framework.
9
  The question is whether the 
next generation of childbearers is strong enough to assert their 
motherliness and control its meaning. I am betting yes.  
                                               
9 Many have suggested that the right to abortion would be more firmly 
protected under a sex equality analysis or a hybrid analysis combining 
protections for liberty, equality, and/or dignity. See generally Siegel, The 
Politics of Protection, supra note 6, at 1694;  Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality 
Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving 
Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007) (noting commonalities 
among sex equality arguments and collecting the literature); Kim Shayo 
Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56 EMORY 
L.J. 1235, 1238 & 1294-1302 (2007) (arguing that Lawrence supports an ―equal 
sexual liberty‖ analysis under which men and women have ―equal due process 
interests in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to 
sex‖); Jack Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, Judgment of the 
Court, and Comment, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 3–27, 37–62, 
232–36 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2005); Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due 
Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
473, 492 (2002) (arguing that ―stereoscopic approach to the fourteenth 
Amendment – one in which understandings of liberty and equality inform one 
another – may change how courts come to see constitutional issues, and may 
lead to fuller and more just answers‖); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A 
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal 
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 263 (1992) (arguing that ―[p]roperly 
understood, constitutional limitations on antiabortion laws, like constitutional 
limitations on antimiscegenation laws, have moorings in both privacy and equal 
protection‖) [hereinafter Reasoning]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on 
Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1308–24 (1991) (addressing 
abortion regulation as issue of sex equality); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some 
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. 
REV. 375, 386 (1985) (arguing that ―the Court‘s Roe position is weakened, . . . 
by the opinion‘s concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the 
exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspective‖). Arguments for 
protection of the right will be strengthened under any one of these frameworks if 
the aspect of abortion that serves women‘s interest in motherhood is 
emphasized.   
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I.  THE IMPORTANCE OF MOTHERHOOD AND OTHER REASONS 
WOMEN CHOOSE ABORTION 
Accurate information about the incidence of abortion and the 
reasons women obtain them is central to the public‘s understanding 
of abortion and the courts‘ continued protection of the right. 
Unfortunately though, few people have accurate information and 
misperceptions about these essential facts abound. This section sets 
out some basic data on abortion incidence and then reviews data 
from recent studies of the reasons women obtain abortions and the 
impact of unintended childbearing that reveal the importance of 
considerations about parenting in abortion decision-making.   
A. Pregnancy and Abortion: the Data
10
 
Nearly half of the approximately six million pregnancies in the 
United States each year are unintended. In 2005, 22% of all 
pregnancies in the United States, both intended and unintended, 
ended in abortion. This equals a rate of 19.4 abortions for every 
1,000 women aged 15 to 44 living in the United States. The 
abortion rate among women with unintended pregnancies is much 
higher, though; a full 40% of these women obtain an abortion.
11
 At 
current rates,
12
 and accounting for women who may have more 
                                               
10 The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the Alan Guttmacher 
Institute (AGI) are recognized as collecting the best statistical abortion data, 
with the CDC recognizing the superiority of the information collected by AGI. 
See generally The Limitations of U.S. Statistics on Abortion, ISSUES IN BRIEF 
(Alan Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.) (Jan. 1997) (discussing reliability of 
different sources of data). Other AGI publications include exhaustive reviews of 
many of the best studies. HEATHER D. BOONSTRA ET AL., ABORTION IN 
WOMEN‘S LIVES 38–44 (Alan Guttmacher Inst. 2006).  
11 Rachel K. Jones, Mia R.S. Zolna, Stanley K. Henshaw, Lawrence B. 
Finer, Abortion in the United States:  Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 40 
PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 9 (2008).  BOONSTRA, supra note 10, 
at 8. 
12 Abortion rates began to decline in the 1990s, after remaining steady for 
most of the 1980s. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion 
Incidence and Services in the United States in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & 
REPROD. HEALTH 6, 6 (2003) [hereinafter Incidence 2000]. Though a dispute 
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than one abortion, more than one-third of American women will 
have had an abortion by the time they turn forty-five.
13
 As this 
number reflects, facing an unintended pregnancy or an intended 
pregnancy gone wrong and choosing an abortion is much more 
likely to occur in the course of a woman‘s lifetime than many 
would like to believe.   
In the United States, approximately 88% of abortions are 
obtained before thirteen weeks of pregnancy, as measured from the 
first day of the woman‘s last menstrual period (LMP).14 
                                               
rages about the causes of the decline, see also id. at 6–7 (discussing possible 
causes of decline), evidence from abroad, as well as the disparity in the rate of 
abortion in unintended versus intended pregnancies here in the United States, 
suggests that abortion rates will decline when the rate of unintended pregnancies 
declines. See BOONSTRA, supra note 10, at 10. For example, the abortion rate in 
the Netherlands is less than half of the U.S. rate despite that abortion in the 
Netherlands is free, legal and widely available. Id. In contrast, the highest rates 
of abortion occur in countries in which abortion is severely restricted by the law, 
and contraceptive use is socially unacceptable. Id. (reporting abortion rate of 50 
per 1,000 in Peru, and 47 per 1,000 in the Dominican Republic). 
13 See LAWRENCE B. FINER & STANLEY K. HENSHAR, ESTIMATES OF U.S. 
ABORTION INCIDENCE, 2001–2003 (Alan Guttmacher Inst. 2006) [hereinafter 
Incidence 2001–2003]; Incidence 2000, supra note 12. 
14 E.g., Abortion Surveillance – United States, 2004, MORBIDITY AND 
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT: SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES (Ctr. for Disease 
Control, Atlanta, Ga.), Nov. 23, 2007 at 16 (Table 1). A note on terminology 
here. When a doctor discusses a woman‘s pregnancy with her, the doctor refers 
to gestational age of a pregnancy as dated from the first day of the woman‘s last 
menstrual period (―LMP‖).  Doctors use this dating because although pregnancy 
usually occurs approximately fourteen days after LMP, ovulation can occur at a 
different point in the cycle, making LMP the only sure date. If you think of 
yourself as fourteen weeks pregnant, conception probably occurred about twelve 
weeks ago. The alternative dating would be ―as measured from conception.‖ 
Unless there is a reference to dating being done from conception, dating is most 
likely being done from LMP. 
 I raise this detail because it can easily be manipulated. Lawyers for women 
and their doctors opposing abortion regulations have always used LMP dating. 
They use it because doctors and most federal reports on abortion use it. See, e.g., 
David A. Grimes, The Continuing Need for Late Abortions, 280 J. AM. MED. 
ASS‘N 747, 747 (1998) [hereinafter Continuing Need] (explaining federal use of 
LMP dating). They use it because the public thinks of pregnancy this way, and 
because they believe using any other dating would mislead the public.  See, e.g., 
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Approximately 5.5% take place after fifteen weeks LMP,
15
 and of 
these only approximately 1.4% occur at twenty-one weeks or 
beyond.
16
 Federal reports do not further break down the category 
of abortions occurring at twenty-one weeks or beyond to determine 
how many women obtain abortions in the third trimester, because 
reports are inaccurate and often include pregnancy terminations 
done for fetal demise.
17
 One researcher reported in 1998 that the 
only published article on third trimester abortions examined 
abortions in Georgia at twenty-five or more weeks in 1979 and 
1980 and reported only three cases out of approximately 70,000 
induced abortions; two procedures were performed for fetal 
anencephaly (the lack of a forebrain), and insufficient information 
was available for the third.
18
   
Over 60% of women obtaining abortions already have children. 
One study found that 61% of the women had children; with 34% 
having two or more children.
19
 Another smaller study found that 
nearly 75% had children, nearly half with two or more.
20
 Almost a 
quarter (23%) of women under the age of twenty terminating their 
pregnancies have at least one child.
21
 The proportion of women 
seeking abortions who already have children has increased over the 
                                               
id. Others use conception dates, usually because they want to give the 
impression that something occurs two weeks earlier than it does. See, e.g., 
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2006, H.R. 6099, 109th Cong. § 2(1) 
(2006) (claiming that fetus has structures to feel pain ―20 weeks after 
fertilization,‖ which actually refers to twenty-two weeks of pregnancy LMP).   
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Continuing Need, supra note 14, at 747–48.  
18 Id. at 748 (citing Alison M. Spitz et al., Third-Trimester Induced 
Abortion in Georgia, 1979 and 1980, 73 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 594. (1983)). 
19 Rachel Jones et al., Patterns in the socioeconomic characteristics of 
women obtaining abortions in 2000-2001, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. 
HEALTH 226, 228 (2002) [hereinafter Socioeconomic Characteristics].  
20 Rachel K. Jones et al., “I Would Want to Give My Child, Like, 
Everything in the World”:  How Issues of Motherhood Influence Women Who 
Have Abortions, 29 J. OF FAMILY ISSUES 79, 86 (2008) [hereinafter Issues of 
Motherhood]. 
21 Socioeconomic Characteristics, supra note 19, at 230. 
SMITH 4/27/2009  7:44 PM 
106 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
years from 44% in 1983 and 55% in 1994 to the present levels.
22
   
Overall, adolescents and lower-income women are more likely 
than older, wealthier women to have abortions in the second-
trimester.
23
 While these groups are overrepresented, women 
obtaining second trimester abortions come from every conceivable 
demographic: rich and poor and middle-income; old and young 
and in between; Catholic, those who identify as ―born-again,‖ 
Buddhist, atheist, etc.; ―pro-choice‖ and ―pro-life.‖24 
B. Why Women Have Abortions 
Two new studies of the reasons women have abortions come to 
interesting conclusions about the role of motherhood in women‘s 
decision-making processes.
25
 Not surprisingly, both studies report 
that the decision to have an abortion at any time in pregnancy is 
motivated by a number of different overlapping factors,
26
 the most 
                                               
22 Stanley Henshaw et al., Abortion patients in 1994-95: Characteristics 
and contraceptive use, 28 FAM. PLAN PERSP. 140 (1996).   
23 Lawrence B. Finer et al., Timing of Steps and Reasons for Delays in 
Obtaining Abortions in the United States, 74 CONTRACEPTION 334, 335 (2006) 
[hereinafter Reasons for Delay]. 
24  Rachel K. Jones, et al., Patterns in the Socioeconomic Characteristics of 
Women Obtaining Abortions in 2000-2001, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. 
HEALTH 226, 229–32, (2002); Brief of the Inst. for Reprod. Health Access & 
Fifty-Two Clinics & Orgs. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21 n.30, 
Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 05-1382, 05-380) [hereinafter 
Brief of IRHA]. The ―pro-life‖ category surprises some, but physicians often 
hear, ―I am pro-life, but [my, my daughter‘s, wife‘s, sister‘s, parishioner‘s] case 
is different.‖ The protester/patient dynamic is not uncommon. Physicians report 
treating protesters, or members of the protester‘s family.  See, e.g., SUSAN 
WICKLUND, THIS COMMON SECRET: MY JOURNEY AS AN ABORTION DOCTOR 
178–84 (Public Affairs 2007).  
25 Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions:  
Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. 
HEALTH 110, 117-18 (2005) [hereinafter Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions]; 
Issues of Motherhood, supra note 20, at 79. 
26 Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions, supra note 25, at 112–13; Issues 
of Motherhood, supra note 20, at 84 (―[M]otherhood issues and responsibilities 
for other children are often related to other issues, such as financial difficulties 
and the lack of a steady . . . partner. Thus, not just motherhood but broader 
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common of which were ―I can‘t afford a baby now‖ (73%)27 and 
―having a baby would dramatically change my life‖ (74%).28 
Forty-eight percent cited relationship problems or a desire to avoid 
single motherhood. Forty percent had completed their 
childbearing. One-third of women were not ready to have a child. 
Another 13% cited concerns about the health of the fetus and 12% 
cited concerns about their own health.
29
 These reasons are the 
same as those cited in earlier studies. 
When women were questioned about what was behind these 
general categories, though, concerns about their ability to nurture a 
child (or another child) both financially and emotionally emerged 
as a consistent theme.
30
 As one study reports:  
More than half of the respondents indicated that their 
abortion decisions were influenced by the perceived 
disadvantages—material and abstract—that the future 
children would experience if they were to carry the 
pregnancies to term. Many of the respondents expressed the 
idea that children are entitled to conditions such as stable 
and loving families, financial security, and a high level of 
care and attention. Because the women were unable to 
provide these things at this time, they were not in a position 
to have a child (or another child). 
31
 
While many women expressed their desire to avoid single 
                                               
parenting and relationship issues play a role in many women‘s decisions to 
abort.‖). 
27 Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions, supra note 25, at 112. This 
number breaks down into women who stated that having a child would disrupt 
education (38%) or work (35%), and those who said it would hurt their other 
children (32%).  Id. at 113. 
28 Id. at 112. This number breaks down in those who were unmarried 
(42%), those who are students (34%), those who can‘t afford the basic needs of 
life (23%) and those who were unemployed (22%). Id. at 113. 
29 Id. at 113. 
30 Issues of Motherhood, supra note 20, at 84; see also Reasons U.S. 
Women Have Abortions, supra note 25, at 117 (―[M]ost women in every 
[category] cited concern for or responsibility to other individuals as a factor in 
their decision to have an abortion.‖).  
31 Issues of Motherhood, supra note 20, at 91. 
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parenting, they also expressed a desire to be ready to be the sole 
provider for their children if it became necessary as a way to avoid 
some of the most acute problems of single parenting, especially 
poverty. As one woman who did not yet have children stated, ―I 
really do want a baby someday. I want to be able to support my 
child and give it everything it needs, and I don‘t want to depend on 
anyone else for it.‖32   
Women who had children ―spoke of the responsibilities they 
were shouldering, and many discussed their desires to provide a 
better home for their existing children and the children whom they 
might have in the future.‖33 They hoped that ―terminating the 
current pregnancies would help them achieve better lives for the 
children they already had.‖34 Women who had not yet had children 
were aware of the responsibilities of motherhood, and they did not 
want to have a baby before they felt able to properly fulfill these 
duties.
35
 As one respondent explained, ―I can‘t have a newborn 
baby and not be able to take care of it, and I would want to give 
my child, like, everything in the world . . . I don‘t think that [my 
partner and I are], like, mentally ready.‖36  
Even women‘s concerns about personal health were themselves 
often expressed in terms of their responsibility for others.
37
 One 
                                               
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 95. 
34 Id. at 96. 
35 Id. at 95. 
36 Id. at 91. 
37 By raising the specter of women making decisions that take others into 
account, especially here where those others are their children, I risk being 
accused of essentialism. See Peggy Cooper Davis & Carol Gilligan, A Woman 
Decides: Justice O’Connor and Due Process Rights Of Choice, 32 MCGEORGE 
L. REV. 895, 897 (2001) (noting that ―the title of Gilligan‘s In a Different Voice 
has caused a confusing oversimplification of Gilligan‘s basic ideas‖); Pamela 
Karlan & Daniel Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion 
Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 858, 871 (1993) 
(discussing the dangers of relational feminism and essentialism); see also 
NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS 
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 150, 166–67 (1978). CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A 
DIFFERENT VOICE 1–2 (2d ed. 1993). But the fact that some women in some 
conditions will make decisions by taking others into account, as reported in 
SMITH 4/27/2009  7:44 PM 
 RESPONSIBILITY FOR LIFE 109 
study reports that women ―revealed how health concerns are linked 
to the concept of responsibility: some women saw the physical 
burden of pregnancy and its associated health conditions as 
threatening their ability to fulfill responsibility to dependents . . . 
[and saw another child as threatening] the economic security of 
their children.‖38  
Studies show a significant increase in the percentage of women 
having abortions because they already have other children 
depending on them, from 19% in 1987 to 32% in 2004. Thus, it 
appears that these concerns about the importance of providing a 
positive nurturing environment for your children ―play an 
increasingly salient role in women‘s abortion decisions.‖39   
C. Special Reasons Women Have Abortions in the Second 
Trimester 
The underlying reasons that women choose abortions in the 
second-trimester are the same as they are in the first, but there are 
additional factors that have delayed their choice. These additional 
factors can be divided into three major categories, some of which 
are well understood, others of which are more complex. The 
categories are: (1) medical factors, including fetal anomalies and 
maternal health conditions that are diagnosed or worsen after the 
first trimester; (2) problems that delay discovery of pregnancy until 
the second-trimester; and (3) obstacles that delay access to 
abortion, especially financial limitations and problems finding 
                                               
these two new studies, does not mean that I am claiming: 1) that all women 
make decisions this way; 2) that women would make decisions this way in 
conditions of ―nature‖ or in conditions of equality, whether considered ―natural‖ 
or ―unnatural‖; 3) that ―relational‖ decision-making is in fact more common 
among women than men, or 4) that men, if faced with these same decisions, 
wouldn‘t also make decisions taking their families into account. Indeed, in a 
recent brief to the U.S. Supreme Court recounting the stories of women 
obtaining second trimester abortions, to the extent women reported on men who 
were involved in their decision-making process, men generally had the same 
considerations as the women. Brief of IRHA at 10–12, 22–23, Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-380). 
38 Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions, supra note 25, at 117–18. 
39 Issues of Motherhood, supra note 20, at 84. 
SMITH 4/27/2009  7:44 PM 
110 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
physicians who will provide abortions.
40
 A much smaller group of 
women have difficulty deciding whether or not to carry the 
pregnancy to term or experience a change in their personal 
circumstances in the second-trimester, such as with a relationship 
or employment.  
1. Medical Factors, Including Fetal Anomalies, and Women’s 
Health Conditions 
As noted above,
41
 13% of women seeking abortions seek them 
because they are concerned about fetal health, and 12% because 
they are concerned about their own health.
42
 In the second 
trimester, the percentage of women citing fetal health concerns 
rises to 21%,
43
 probably because many fetal anomalies are not 
diagnosed and confirmed until the second-trimester. The 
percentage of women citing personal health concerns remains 
fairly constant at 10%.
44
   
Women’s Health and Lives: Overall during the twentieth 
century as medical treatments improved, our ability to treat the 
                                               
40 Ironically, many abortion regulations that are allegedly intended to 
convince women not to obtain an abortion, such as mandatory delay laws, or 
that are intended just to limit access to abortions altogether, actually push many 
women into the second-trimester of pregnancy, increasing the numbers of the 
least-favored and medically riskier abortions. To the delight of some, these types 
of restrictions also prevent some women from obtaining abortions altogether.  
See Michael J. New, The I’s Have It:  Three cheers for pro-life incrementalism, 
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, April 19, 2007, http://article.nationalreview.com 
/?q=MTZlYzNmY2M4OTFhMjAzNWI4OGYwMDAyMjViZGI5NjA=#more 
(describing debate since 1970s). 
41 See supra text accompanying note 29.  
42 Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions, supra note 25, at 116 (Table 6), 
117.   
43 Id., supra note 25, at 116 (Table 6). 
44 Id. Logically, women with preexisting health conditions advising against 
pregnancy altogether would terminate earlier in pregnancy; a second category of 
women whose health does not become problematic until the second trimester 
would terminate later. Many of the women in this second category are carrying 
wanted pregnancies and have often delayed as long as possible while doctors 
confirm an original bad diagnosis, or while their own health condition 
deteriorates, waiting and hoping that they can carry the pregnancy to term. 
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complications of pregnancy improved as well. As a result, the 
overall risk of death from pregnancy decreased from 850 per 
100,000 in 1900 to approximately 7 to 8 women per 100,000 in 
1982.
45
 Progress stopped there however and mortality rates in the 
United States actually went up between 1991 and 1999. By 1999, 
13.2 women per 100,000 died during pregnancy. The increase may 
be caused by the increase in pregnancy among women over thirty-
five who have a greater risk for pregnancy-related illness. In terms 
of mortality, twenty-one per 100,000 women aged thirty-five to 
thirty-nine, and forty-five per 100,000 women aged forty and over, 
die each year from a pregnancy-related illness.
46
 The leading 
causes of pregnancy-related death were embolism (20%), 
hemorrhage (17%), and pregnancy-induced hypertension (16%).
47
  
In addition, an alarming disparity in the risk for pregnancy-
related death exists between African-American women and white 
women. Overall, mortality ratios (deaths per 100,000 live births) 
for African-American women are 3 to 4 times higher than for 
white women. In other words, 30 out of every 100,000 African-
American women, compared with 8 out of every 100,000 white 
women, die from a pregnancy-related illness each year.
48
 The 
mortality rates and the racial disparities only increase as women 
age. At ages thirty-five to thirty-nine, seventy per 100,000 African-
American women—versus less than 20 per 100,000 white 
women—die from a pregnancy-related illness each year.49 For 
women forty and over, the numbers skyrocket, with 160 per 
100,000 African-American women versus approximately 30 per 
100,000 white women dying from a pregnancy-related illness each 
year, a ratio 5.5 times higher for African-Americans.
50
   
The risks of morbidities—complications during pregnancy 
                                               
45 Jeani Chang et al., Pregnancy-Related Mortality Surveillance – United 
States, 1991-1999, 52 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT NO. SS-2 at 2 (CDC, Feb. 21, 
2003). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 4–5. 
48 Id. at 2–3 & Table 1. 
49 Id. at Figure 2. 
50 Id.  
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which do not result in death—also increase dramatically for 
women over 35. Twelve out of 100 pregnant women over thirty-
five are hospitalized for obstetrical complications prior to 
delivery.
51
 
Pregnancy can impact a woman‘s health in three ways. First, 
women can develop conditions specific to pregnancy, such as 
hypertensive disorders,
52
 hemorrhage,
53
 hypovolemic shock
54
 and 
disseminated intravascular coagulation,
55
 and preterm birth,
56
 all of 
which can place the lives and health of women at significant risk. 
One of the most serious is preeclampsia, a hypertensive disorder 
involving rapidly increasing blood pressure that puts the woman at 
risk of deterioration of function in a number of organs and systems 
and, eventually, eclampsia, which involves seizures, coma, and in 
                                               
51 Trude A. Bennett et al., Pregnancy-Associated Hospitalizations in 
United States in 1991 and 1992, 178 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNEC. 346, 348 (1998). 
52 F. GARY CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 693–744 (20th 
ed. 1997) (describing complications associated with hypertensive disorders, such 
as preeclampsia and eclampsia) [hereinafter WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS]. 
53 Id. at 745–82 (―Even though the maternal mortality rate has been reduced 
dramatically by hospitalization for delivery and the availability of blood from 
transfusion, death from hemorrhage remains prominent in the majority of 
mortality reports.‖). 
54 ―Hypovolemic shock is an emergency condition in which severe blood 
and fluid loss makes the heart unable to pump enough blood to the body.‖ 
Hypovolemic shock in MEDLINE PLUS MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000167.htm#Definition; 
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 783–96 (―Despite the availability of 
modern blood-banking techniques, hemorrhage leading to hypovolemic shock 
remains a significant cause of maternal mortality in obstetrics.‖). 
55 ―Disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) is a serious disorder in 
which the proteins that control blood clotting become abnormally active.‖ 
Medline Plus Medical Encyclopedia: Disseminated intravascular coagulation, 
available at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000573.htm 
#Definition. DIC can lead to ―temporary hemophilia.‖ WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, 
supra note 52, at 787–96. Small blood clots form within, and can clog up, the 
blood vessels, cutting off blood supply to various organs such as the liver or 
kidney. These organs will then stop functioning. The clotting proteins of the 
blood become ―used up‖ by the clots, leaving the patient at risk for serious 
internal bleeding or bleeding from minor cuts and bruises. Id. It too can be 
deadly. 
56 WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 797–826.  
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some cases death.
57
 When moderate or severe preeclampsia does 
not improve after hospitalization, ―delivery is usually advisable for 
the welfare of both mother and fetus.‖58 The condition usually does 
not develop until after twenty weeks‘ gestation, and many women 
attempt to continue the pregnancy until well after viability to give 
their baby the best chance of survival.
59
   
Another very serious pregnancy-related condition is 
chorioamnionitis, or infection of the uterine lining, which can 
develop from premature rupture of the membranes. Again, the 
fetus must be delivered and the infection treated so that the woman 
does not develop sepsis, an infection of her blood which can be 
fatal. It too is not likely to develop before the second trimester.
60
 
Second, there are conditions that can happen to anyone, but 
that are more likely to occur in pregnant women. For example, the 
likelihood of thromboembolism—blood clots in the lower 
extremities that can lead to pulmonary embolism (blood clots in 
the lungs)—in a normal pregnancy and the period immediately 
after childbirth ―is increased by a factor of five when compared 
with nonpregnant women of similar age.‖61 As a leading textbook 
reports, ―venous thrombosis and pulmonary embolism remain a 
major cause of maternal death in the United States.‖62 Moreover, 
some fetal anomalies, including non-immune hydrops and fetal 
ascites,
63
 are known to lead to serious maternal pregnancy 
                                               
57 Id. at 702 
58 Id. at 717. 
59 Id. at 716–17; see also STEVEN GABBE, JENNIFER NIEBYL, JOE LEIGH 
SIMPSON, OBSTETRICS: NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES (4th ed. 2001) 
[hereinafter NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES]. 
60 WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 657–58; id. at 328–29 (noting 
that ―if delivery is delayed for 24 hours or more after membrane rupture, there is 
increasing likelihood of serious intrauterine infection‖). 
61 Id. at 1112. 
62 Id.  
63 Non-immune hydrops, or ―hydrops fetalis,‖ is a serious condition in 
which abnormal amounts of fluid build up in two or more body areas of a fetus 
or newborn. Hydrops fetalis in MEDLINE PLUS MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
available at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007308.htm 
#Definition.  Fetal ascites similarly involves an abnormal accumulation of fluid 
in the peritoneal cavity, causing abdominal swelling. See WILLIAMS 
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complications.
64
 
Finally, pregnancy can worsen a condition in a woman already 
unhealthy in some respect. For example, the blood volume of a 
pregnant woman at or near term averages about 40 to 45% above 
nonpregnant levels, and in some women, can be nearly double 
nonpregnant levels.
65
 The pregnant woman‘s heart rate increases to 
pump this additional blood, taxing the cardiovascular system. As a 
result, a woman with any sort of heart or vascular condition, 
whether known or unknown, is at increased risk during 
pregnancy
66
 and may be advised to terminate depending on her 
prognosis.
67
 Overall, heart disease complicates about 1% of 
pregnancies.
68
   
Similarly, pregnancy poses additional risks to women with, or 
at risk of, diabetes, the most common medical complication of 
pregnancy. The dramatic hormonal changes of pregnancy can 
make it difficult for a woman with preexisting diabetes to control 
her blood sugars, and clinical diabetes may appear in some women 
only during pregnancy. Women with pre-existing diabetes and 
women with gestational diabetes are at risk of seizures or diabetic 
coma if the woman‘s blood sugars are not controlled.   
These cardiovascular or endocrine system conditions will 
worsen as pregnancy progresses,
69
 as will the conditions of women 
with many other diseases, including some with diseases of the 
nervous system, some women with epilepsy, liver diseases, and 
certain cancers. Often, complications from preexisting conditions 
do not arise until the second trimester of pregnancy, or their 
                                               
OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 456–57. 
64 See, e.g., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 995 (noting that 
maternal complications due to carrying a fetus with non-immune hydrops 
include an increased incidence of preeclampsia, preterm labor, and postpartum 
hemorrhage).  
65 Id. at 201. 
66 See generally Chapter 47: Cardiovascular Diseases, in WILLIAMS 
OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, 1079–1101. 
67 WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, 1083. 
68 Id. at 1079. 
69 See generally Section X: Common Complications of Pregnancy, in 
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 693–894.    
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severity is tolerable until then.
70
 As David Grimes, M.D.,
71
 points 
out, the availability of abortion is pronatalist in the sense that some 
women, especially some in this last category, would not become 
pregnant and try to carry to term if abortion were not available to 
ensure that they could terminate the pregnancy if a problem does 
arise.
72
   
Fetal Anomalies: There are hundreds of fetal anomalies that 
are either lethal or would result in a child with significant 
morbidity. Among these conditions are Trisomy 13 and 18, which 
are often fatal chromosomal anomalies;
73
 neural-tube defects, 
including anencephaly, a lethal disorder characterized by the 
absence of the cranium
74
 and open spina bifida, in which parts of 
the neural system are outside of the body;
75
 conjoined twins; 
                                               
70 See, e.g., Brief of IRHA at 14–15, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 
(2007) (Nos. 05-1382, 05-380) (quoting statement from pregnant woman with 
lupus and a statement from pregnant woman with placenta previa (a placenta 
covering the birth canal which puts the woman at risk of massive hemorrhaging) 
who developed preeclampsia (high blood pressure of 220 over 135) and kidney 
problems creating a significant risk of stroke and seizure). 
71 David A. Grimes, M.D., is a well-known and highly respected 
obstetrician/gynecologist, who has had a dual career in clinical ob/gyn and 
preventive medicine for the past three decades. David A. Grimes, M.D., 
http://davidagrimes.com/index.html. Dr. Grimes currently serves as Clinical 
Professor in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University of 
North Carolina School of Medicine, and Vice President of Biomedical Affairs at 
Family Health International. He also serves on the editorial boards of several 
prominent medical journals, including The Lancet, Obstetrics and Gynecology, 
Obstetrical and Gynecological Survey, and Contraception and has received 
numerous honors and awards for his research, teaching, and clinical work. He 
has served as an epidemiologist at the Centers for Disease Control for nine 
years, and a faculty member in four medical schools: Emory University, 
University of Southern California, University of California-San Francisco, and 
University of North Carolina. Id. 
72 Continuing Need, supra note 14, at 749. 
73 Nearly 50% of infants born with Trisomy 13 die in the first month, and 
relatively few survive past three years of age. NORMAL AND PROBLEM 
PREGNANCIES, supra note 59, at 141.  Trisomy 18 is often detected in stillborn 
infants and mean survival rates are in the months.  Id. at 142.  
74 WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 52, at 907–08.  
75 Id. 
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congenital heart disease;
76
 congenital diaphragmatic hernia;
77
 
genetic neurological disorders with progressive psycho-motor 
deterioration, such as Tay-Sachs and Canavan‘s diseases;78 and 
Potter‘s syndrome (or renal agenesis), in which the kidneys fail to 
develop.
79
 Women generally do not detect these anomalies until 
the second trimester.   
Structural fetal anomalies, such as renal agenesis, anencephaly, 
and skeletal dysplasia, are typically not detected until the woman 
has her routine ultrasound, which usually takes place at around 
eighteen weeks LMP. Chromosomal fetal anomalies are typically 
not detected until the second trimester because amniocentesis, the 
most common test for genetic chromosomal anomalies, cannot be 
performed accurately before about fifteen to sixteen weeks LMP 
and the results are not available until at least one week afterward, 
well into the second trimester.
80
 Even though a new screening test 
can be performed earlier in pregnancy, it is only useful to identify 
a limited subset of abnormalities identifiable by amniocentesis.
81
 
                                               
76 Id. at 908. 
77 There is a high incidence of associated severe malformations or 
chromosomal anomalies with diaphragmatic hernia contributing to a high 
perinatal mortality rate and to the approximately 75% rate of death of affected 
fetuses or neonates; ―uncomplicated‖ diaphragmatic hernia is fatal in 
approximately 45% of the cases. Id. at 911–12. 
78 See National-Tay Sachs & Allied Diseases Association website, 
http://www.ntsad.org/. Tay-Sachs disease is a progressive neurological genetic 
disorder in which development slows and the infant gradually regresses, 
eventually becoming blind, mentally retarded, paralyzed, and non-responsive to 
his or her environment. Canavan‘s disease begins with visual inattentiveness or 
an inability to perform motor tasks at around three to nine months, is evidenced 
by overall low muscle tone and lack of head control, a deterioration of motor 
skills and mental functioning, seizures and feeding problems. Many children 
with Canavan disease die in infancy, though some survive into adolescence and 
even occasionally into adulthood. 
79 See, e.g., NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES, supra note 59, 909–10 
(noting that one-third of infants with renal agenesis are stillborn and the longest 
reported survival is 48 hours); Brief of IRHA at 7–8, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. 
Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 05-1382, 05-380). 
80 See generally Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis, in NORMAL AND PROBLEM 
PREGNANCIES, supra note 59, at 152–83. 
81 NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES, supra note 59, at 155–58. 
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Moreover, women who are at low risk for fetal anomalies often 
do not have routine amniocentesis because of the risks that 
accompany the test. In those cases, chromosomal anomalies are 
sometimes suspected only after a routine ultrasound has been 
performed at approximately eighteen weeks LMP. When that 
occurs, amniocentesis to confirm suspected anomalies may not be 
performed until well after eighteen weeks LMP. 
In describing their decision-making processes in these tragic 
cases, ―[w]omen repeatedly state that one of the main reasons they 
choose to terminate wanted pregnancies is that the information 
they learn in the second trimester confirms, if the fetus were to 
survive, its life would be short and fraught with pain.‖82 As the 
amicus brief filed by the Institute for Reproductive Health Access 
in Planned Parenthood v. Gonzales reported, one woman 
interviewed whose baby had ―Cat-Eye Syndrome‖83 explained, 
―[w]e made this decision because we loved our daughter so much. 
We didn‘t want her to suffer the definite and the untold problems 
she was sure to endure, if she even made it . . . . We fought for her. 
We wanted her. But we didn‘t want to condem[n] her to [a] life of 
agony.‖84 Another married woman and mother of a three-year-old 
described similar concern for her son: 
So all the fluid was shown on the brain [and] stomach and 
[the physician] believed the baby had a very severe case of 
heart defect. And most likely—90% chance that he was 
going to die in utero . . . . And even the 10% that he was 
going to be born he wasn‘t going to live very far without, I 
                                               
82 Brief of IRHA at 11, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 
05-1382, 05-380).  
83 Trisomy 22, or ―cat eye‖ syndrome, is a chromosomal disorder in which 
there are three copies of chromosome 22 rather than two. The most common 
association of symptoms include a hole in or absence of tissue from the iris, 
obstructions of the anus, and renal abnormalities such as missing or 
underdeveloped kidneys and cardiac defects. See, e.g., Rosias PR et al., 
Phenotypic variability of the cat eye syndrome:  Case report and review of the 
literature, 12 GENETIC COUNSELING 272-82 (2003) (noting that cat eye 
syndrome is characterized by large phenotypic variability), abstract available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11693792.   
84 Brief of IRHA at 11. 
SMITH 4/27/2009  7:44 PM 
118 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
mean, even with major interventions it was very unlikely 
that he was going to survive . . . . [S]o at the time, we made 
a decision to terminate because I couldn‘t—knowing the 
outcome of what was going to happen I just couldn‘t carry 
on. I mean why put the baby through suffering if I can end 
his life and set him free of his suffering that he had to 
endure. That was our thinking.
85
 
After diagnosis, understandably some women and their 
families need time to decide what to do. Another woman reported: 
It took me an agonizing week to make this heartbreaking 
choice, but in the end I know it was the best decision for 
me, my family and most importantly, our child. We lost our 
oldest son at 6 years and 10 months old to complications 
from having a rare type of dwarfism. That dwarfism was 
exactly the reason why we had the CVS test done. We 
knew without a doubt that we could never in good 
conscience bring another child into this world with that 
disease . . . . Most genetic defects come with their own list 
of extra problems, which I didn‘t take into account, and put 
that child at risk for painful procedures and even death. No 
child deserves to come into a world of pain. That is what 
made my decision for me . . . .
86
 
2. Delay in Obtaining Abortions 
Two recent studies found that most women who obtain 
abortions in the second trimester, other than those obtaining 
abortions because of maternal or fetal health conditions, either did 
not know they were pregnant until the second trimester or had 
difficulty obtaining insurance coverage and raising funds to pay for 
the procedure.
87
 Other delays were caused by government 
                                               
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 10–11. 
87 Reasons for Delay, supra note 23, at 2; Eleanor Drey et al., Risk Factors 
Associated with Presenting for Abortion in the Second Trimester, 107 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 128, 132 (Table 3) (2006) (hereinafter Risk 
Factors); see also The Continuing Need, supra note 14, at 748. 
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restrictions on abortion that made access difficult or by emotional 
issues that delayed an ultimate decision.
88
   
Problems Suspecting and Confirming Pregnancy: On 
television and even in fairy tales, women wake up and vomit, or 
find their pants getting tight and—voila!—they realize they are 
pregnant. Both the Risk Factors and Reasons for Delay studies 
show however, that many women obtaining abortions in the second 
trimester had only recently discovered they were pregnant.
89
 The 
simple fact is that for many women, pregnancy is not obvious. 
Consider also that, as one study showed, more than two-thirds of 
the women having abortions in the second trimester had been using 
contraception when they became pregnant, creating a false sense of 
security.
90
 
Some women are unaware of the correlation between a missed 
period and pregnancy.
91
 For others, such as women with irregular 
periods, women on certain forms of birth control, or those 
experiencing periods of stress or illness, the correlation does not 
even exist—a missed period is nothing out of the ordinary.92 One 
woman explained: 
I was unemployed and had no health insurance . . . . I had 
no doctor, I had no gynecologist and was just trying to get a 
job so that I could support myself and take care of my 
immediate needs. So my health was very secondary. Also, 
                                               
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 9–10 (reporting that 36% of the women who were delayed took a 
long time to find out about the pregnancy and that this was the third most 
common reason for delay); Risk Factors, supra note 87, at 130 & 132 (Table 3) 
(reporting that approximately 34% of the women who obtained second trimester 
abortions did not realize they were pregnant until well into the pregnancy).    
90 Risk Factors, supra note 87, at 130 & 131 Table 1. 
91 Reasons for Delay, supra note 23, at 9–10 (reporting that minors took a 
week longer than all other age groups to suspect pregnancy, that both minors 
and older teens took longer than average time to confirm pregnancies with a test, 
and discussing one adolescent who had missed her period for a few months but 
did not know this could be a pregnancy indication). 
92 Over one-half of respondents who took longer to suspect pregnancy had 
irregular periods prior to this pregnancy because of having had a baby or a 
miscarriage within the last six months and/or using an injectable contraceptive. 
Id. at 10.   
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because of my personal health history it was normal for me 
to not menstruate for extended periods of time . . . 
especially when . . . I‘m feeling stressed . . . . So because of 
those factors I just wasn‘t aware of what had happened.93 
Another woman had a similar story:  
I had an IUD inserted in early November, and I was told 
that it was common for women to stop menstruating. I 
conceived a week after my IUD was inserted, despite using 
condoms as a back-up method. I wasn‘t even aware I was 
pregnant until the end of January, and even then, I only 
took a test out of paranoia . . . . The risks from an IUD 
pregnancy, coupled with our financial situation led us to 
make the decision for abortion. It was too soon for us to 
have another child. My daughter is still just an infant, and 
deserves all our love and attention.
94
 
Other women‘s bodies will mask the signs of pregnancy; they 
will lose weight or continue to menstruate throughout the first 
trimester.
95
 This can fool those who know the signs of pregnancy 
and even women who have been pregnant before. One woman I 
knew told me that while she was writing her Ph.D. dissertation and 
caring for her first child, she was under an extreme amount of 
stress, financially strapped and losing weight, not gaining. She 
finally missed a period, which she attributed to stress, and only 
went to the doctor because she was tired all the time and thought 
perhaps she was anemic because of the weight loss. She was 
shocked to find out she was twenty-two weeks pregnant. 
Dr. Grimes points out that women, especially young teenagers 
or women with mental handicaps, who have become pregnant by 
rape or incest and did not receive medical attention
96
 may not 
                                               
93 Brief for IRHA at 20–21, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) 
(Nos. 05-1382, 05-380).  
94 Id. at 19. 
95 Risk Factors, supra note 87, at 134 (stating that ―many women seeking 
second-trimester abortions simply lacked pregnancy symptoms or were unaware 
of their last menstrual period‖). 
96 Half of all rape victims receive no medical attention. Continuing Need, 
supra note 14, at 749 (citing Melissa M. Holmes et al., Rape-related pregnancy: 
Estimates and descriptive characteristics from a national sample of women, 175 
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discover they are pregnant until they are in their second-
trimester.
97
 Thirty-two thousand pregnancies result from rape each 
year and one-third of these women do not discover their 
pregnancies until the second-trimester.   
Financial and Other Logistical Barriers: Financial and other 
logistical barriers caused many women to delay their abortions 
significantly.
98
 According to Reasons for Delay, the most common 
cause of delay was financial. Of the second-trimester abortion 
patients who would have preferred to have their abortions earlier, 
36% reported that they needed additional time to raise money or 
obtain insurance coverage. The study reports that some women had 
made and cancelled multiple appointments ―because they didn‘t 
have enough money to cover the procedure and one woman said 
that she had waited an entire month for her Medicaid coverage to 
become active.‖99 Moreover, the price for the abortion often 
increases while women delay the procedure in an attempt to gather  
funds. The increase in costs can then cause further delays. A single 
mother of two reported:  
I was trying to get the money up but the longer you wait the 
more it is. Then I‘m Rh negative so you have to pay for the 
shot. And it‘s just more and more. It builds up to the point 
where—what if I didn‘t have it today and it was $1500 in a 
week? And then it was almost $2000 . . . .
100
 
                                               
AMER. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 320, 320–25(1996)). 
97 Continuing Need, supra note 14, at 749; see also Brief for IRHA at 21 
n.28, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 05-1382, 05-380) (―He 
forced his way into my door into my living room and raped me on my living 
room floor . . . I . . . got the pregnancy test. And it was so positive . . . .  And I 
cried for days.‖).   
98 Reasons for Delay, supra note 23, at 15 & Table 1; see also, e.g., Stanley 
K. Henshaw & Lynn S. Wallisch, Medicaid Cutoff and Abortion Servs. For the 
Poor, 16 FAMILY PLANNING PERSEPCTIVES 170, 170 (1984) (finding that low-
income women on average delay accessing abortion an additional two to three 
weeks because of difficulties in obtaining funds). 
99 Id. at 15.  
100 Brief for IRHA at 18, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 
05-1382, 05-380). 
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Financial factors were less significant in the Risk Factors study 
which examined a population in California, probably because 
California is one of seventeen states that provides coverage for 
abortions in its Medicaid program.
101
 Even in this study, however, 
women obtaining abortions in the second-trimester were more 
likely than women obtaining abortions in the first trimester to 
report difficulty obtaining insurance coverage from private insurers 
as well as from the state‘s Medicaid program as a delaying 
factor.
102
  
Additional logistical factors also cause significant delays for 
some women. In one study, an initial referral to a medical facility 
that could not perform that abortion ―was the single most 
frequently reported delay causing factor by second-trimester 
patients.‖103 One woman explained the problems she encountered 
finding an abortion provider: 
Once I realized and accepted I was pregnant, I made my 
appointment at Planned Parenthood of Idaho and was 5 
days past the deadline. I was 14 weeks. Scared but being 
responsible I took a seven hour bus drive to Salt Lake City 
                                               
101  The federal government and thirty-three states refuse to provide public 
funding for medically necessary abortions. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE: STATE 
POLICIES IN BRIEF, STATE FUNDING OF ABORTION UNDER MEDICAID (2009), 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf.   
102 Risk Factors, supra note 87, at 134. Seventy-four percent of women pay 
―out-of-pocket‖ for abortion procedures, and four states restrict private insurers 
from providing coverage except in cases that would endanger a woman‘s life if 
carried to term. See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, 
RESTRICTING INS. COVERAGE OF ABORTION 1 (2006). 
103 Risk Factors, supra note 87, at 130 (Table 3) (47% of women seeking 
second trimester abortions cited referral to another clinic as a factor causing 
delay); see also Reasons for Delay, supra note 23, at 13 (11% of women who 
were delayed had been to another clinic before finding the facility; these women 
took over twice as long on average to obtain the abortion). In 2000, abortion 
providers operated in only 13% of counties and three non-metropolitan areas in 
the United States. Incidence 2000, supra note 12, at 10–11. Only 33% of 
providers offer abortion services at twenty weeks gestation and 24% provide 
services at twenty-one weeks. Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence B. Finer, 
Accessibility of Abortion Servs. in the U.S. 2001, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & 
REPROD. HEALTH 16, 18 (2003). 
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and was turned away again because I was 7 days past 18 
weeks (which increases by $500). I therefore had to 
leave . . . . I am currently at [a clinic in Oregon] . . . . I am 
21 weeks [pregnant].
104
 
Other Legal Restrictions on Abortion: In addition to bans on 
Medicaid funding for abortion and the subsequent desperate hunt 
for the funds to pay for abortion, other government-imposed 
restrictions on abortion can also delay abortions into the second 
trimester. For example, one study found that Mississippi‘s 
mandatory delay law, which requires a woman to make two in-
person visits to a clinic prior to obtaining the abortion, was 
independently associated with delays in obtaining an abortion.
105
 
After implementation, the study found that ―the proportion of 
second-trimester procedures increased by 53% (from 7.5% of 
abortions to 11.5%)‖ among women whose closest provider was 
in-state and subject to the law.
106
 Parental involvement laws can 
also push young women into the second trimester because they are 
afraid to involve their parents, and it can take a significant amount 
of time to navigate judicial bypass systems and wait for court 
orders. Some young women even delay their abortions until they 
turn eighteen.
107
 
                                               
104 Brief for IRHA at 18–19, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) 
(Nos. 05-1382, 05-380). 
105 See Ted Joyce & Robert Kaestner, The Impact of Mississippi’s 
Mandatory Delay Law on the Timing of Abortion, 32 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 4 
(2000) (hereinafter Impact of Mandatory Delay); see also A Woman‘s Choice-
East Side Women‘s Clinic v. Newman, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1159–60 (S.D. 
Ind. 2001) (Enforcement of the Indiana waiting period law‘s provision ―which 
effectively requires two trips to an abortion clinic,‖ was likely to prevent 
approximately 10 to 13 % of the women in Indiana—1300 to 1700 women—
who would otherwise obtain abortions from obtaining them and cause a 
significant increase in the proportion of second trimester abortions, which are 
both riskier and more expensive than earlier abortions, not because of any 
―persuasive effect‖ of the law, but instead because of ―the burdens that the ‗in 
the presence‘ requirement would impose on women.‖), rev’d on other grounds, 
305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002). 
106 Impact of Mandatory Delay, supra note 105, at 4. 
107 Ted Joyce et al., Changes in Abortions and Births and the Texas 
Parental Notification Law, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1031, 1036 (2006); Brief for 
SMITH 4/27/2009  7:44 PM 
124 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Decision-making and Emotional Difficulties: In Reasons for 
Delay, Finer reports that 50% of the second-trimester patients who 
would have preferred to have their abortions earlier ultimately took 
a long time to decide whether to have an abortion. Thirty-three 
percent of these women reported that it was a difficult decision to 
make; 18% were worried about the cost; 15% reported it ―took 
time‖ to talk to their husband/partner; and 15% had ―religious or 
moral‖ concerns.108 Nine percent of women were waiting for their 
relationship with their husband/partner to change, and 9% were 
afraid to tell their husband/partner or parents they were 
pregnant.
109
 Similarly, Risk Factors reports that women cited 
similar factors causing delay such as difficulty deciding (57%), 
being ―in denial‖ that they were pregnant (54%), being sad or 
depressed (67%), and fear to have the abortion (79%), but these 
factors were the same among second-trimester and first-trimester 
patients.
110
 
D. The Impact of Unintended Childbearing 
Studies show that women are correct in assessing the risks to 
themselves and to their children of unintended childbearing. 
Unhealthy behaviors and postpartum depression are more 
prevalent among mothers with unintended births than among those 
with intended or mistimed births, and these behaviors and a 
mother‘s mental health status can have a significant impact on 
children.
111
   
                                               
IRHA at 20 n.25, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 05-1382, 
05-380); see also Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare 
When They Seek Court-Authorized Abortions, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 259 (1983). 
108 Reasons for Delay, supra note 23, at Table 1. 
109 Id.  
110 Risk Factors, supra note 87, at 131. 
111 See, e.g., Diana Cheng, Eleanor B. Scharz, Erika Douglas & Isabelle 
Horon, Unintended Pregnancy and Associated Maternal Preconception, 
Prenatal and Postpartum Behaviors, -- CONTRACEPTION --- (2008) (accepted 
article in press; on file with the Journal of Law and Policy) (hereinafter 
Unintended Pregnancy); Jennifer S. Barber, William G. Axinn & Arland 
Thornton, Unwanted Childbearing, Health, and Mother-Child Relationships, 40 
J. HEALTH & SOC‘L BEHAVIOR 231, 249 (1999) (hereinafter Mother-Child 
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For example, even after controlling for socio-demographic 
factors, one recent study found that women with unwanted or 
mistimed pregnancies were more than two times as likely to smoke 
during the last 3 months of pregnancy—and presumably 
throughout pregnancy because it is unlikely that women would 
start smoking while they are pregnant
112—were more than twice as 
likely to report inadequate daily consumption of folic acid,
113
 and 
were more likely to delay initiation of prenatal care until after the 
first trimester.
114
 While many mothers with unintended births 
attempt to practice healthy behaviors such as initiation of breast 
feeding,
115
 the study reports that ―the more challenging [healthy] 
behaviors, such as continuing breastfeeding for 8 weeks‘ duration 
and smoking cessation, were less prevalent among women with 
[unintended pregnancies] than among women with intended or 
mistimed ones.‖116 Moreover, studies have found ―strong evidence 
that mothers who reported [unintended childbearing] have worse 
mental health in terms of self-reported depression and happiness‖ 
and that ―[t]hese associations between having [unintended] births 
and [poor] mental health are quite strong.‖117   
                                               
Relationships); see also generally THE BEST INTENTIONS: UNINTENDED 
PREGNANCY AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (Sarah Brown 
and Leon Eisenberg, eds., National Academies Press - INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE 
REPORT 1995) (hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT). 
112 Unintended Pregnancy, supra note 111, at 2; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE 
REPORT, supra note 111, at 68–70.  
113 Unintended Pregnancy, supra  note 111 at 3. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 3–4 (also noting that these women were as likely as mothers with 
intended births to place their infants to sleep on their backs and use postpartum 
contraception). 
116 Id. at 4. 
117 Mother-Child Relationships, supra note 111, at 249; see also 
Unintended Pregnancy, supra note 112, at 4 (finding ―women with unwanted 
births were nearly twice as likely to report feeling depressed during the 
postpartum period as women with intended births‖); id. (noting that study results 
confirmed the results of previous studies which also found higher levels of 
depression among mothers with unwanted births); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE 
REPORT, supra note 111, at 75. 
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Postpartum depression is a concern not only for the mother but 
also for her child. Postpartum depression ―has been shown to result 
in poor mother-infant interactions and subsequent behavioral and 
cognitive difficulties for the child.‖118 Specifically, ―mothers who 
had [unintended births] spent significantly less leisure time outside 
of the home with their children,‖119 and spank or slap their children 
more often than other mothers.
120
 While these ―findings roughly 
parallel research on interaction between depressed mothers and 
their infants‖ which shows that ―depressed mothers interact either 
aggressively (e.g., physical punishment) or in a withdrawn manner 
(e.g., spend less leisure time) with their infants,‖121 the incidence 
of withdrawn or aggressive behavior of mothers with unwanted 
childbearing towards their children does not correlate completely 
with their mental health status.
122
 In other words, while poor 
mental health status ―may exacerbate the relationship between 
unwanted childbearing and lower quality mother-child 
interactions,‖ it does not account for it entirely.123 
Not surprisingly, these poor parent child relationships that can 
develop from unwanted childbearing ―impede[] the [child‘s] 
socialization process, [which] . . . may have implications for many 
other dimensions of well-being, even into adulthood.
124
 For 
example, the socialization process ―has been linked to a variety of 
important social outcomes such as educational attainment, 
occupational attainment, personality, child development, self-
esteem and marital relationships.‖125 Unintended childbearing and 
these poor parent-child relationships that develop continue to affect 
the way the mother-child relationship develops into adulthood; 
                                               
118 Unintended Pregnancy, supra note 111, at 4 (citations omitted).   
119 Mother-Child Relationships, supra note 111, at 250. 
120 Id.  
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 250–51 (finding that ―mother‘s mental health . . . did not mediate 
the relationship between unwanted childbearing and physical punishment or . . . 
leisure time activities‖). 
123 Id. at 251. 
124 Id. at 253.   
125 Id. (internal citations omitted).   
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mothers with more births than they wanted give less social support 
to their adult children.
126
   
In conclusion, unintended childbearing ―leads to outcomes that 
are problematic for both mothers and their children, including 
mental health problems for mothers, lower quality relationships 
between mothers and children in terms of affection and social 
support, and increased violence and less leisure time interaction 
during childhood.‖127 Many women who choose abortion are 
choosing to decrease the likelihood that these outcomes will 
become reality for them and their children. They are choosing 
abortion in the interest of motherhood.
128
 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL ABORTION BALANCE: VALUING 
WOMEN‘S INTERESTS IN ABORTION 
Given the extensive evidence that supports what many women 
have long known, that women have abortions because they feel 
responsible for any life they bring into the world, and because they 
care about how any child they bear—if they are to bear one—will 
be mothered, the question is how has this aspect of abortion been 
                                               
126 Id. at 246.   
127 Id. at 253.   
128 Pregnancy intention may even have an impact on physical maternal and 
birth outcomes, as a recent study examining the relationship between a woman‘s 
pregnancy intention and physical maternal and birth outcomes found. A.P. 
Mohallajee, K. M. Curtis, B. Morrow, & P.A. Marchbanks, Pregnancy Intention 
and Its Relationship to Birth and Maternal Outcomes, 109 Obstetrics & 
Gynecology 678 (2007) (noting that ―[a] handful of studies have documented 
associations between pregnancy intention and other outcomes, such as 
depression, physical abuse, and postpartum depression, but research focused 
specifically on the relationship between unintended pregnancy and maternal 
outcomes is limited‖); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 111, at 70–
72 (finding association between unintended childbearing and low birthweight 
and infant mortality). One recent study reported that although research on the 
issue is limited, the results support the view that ―pregnancy intention may be an 
indicator for increased risk of poor outcomes, including low birth weight, 
preterm delivery and premature rupture of the membranes.‖ Id.; but see Mother-
Child Relationships, supra note 111, at 249 (finding that poor ―physical health is 
not significantly related to having unwanted births‖).  
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treated in abortion jurisprudence. The answer is that it is given 
short shrift. To the extent the Court has recognized this aspect of 
the decision, and it has, its recognition is fading. It is time for the 
courts to confront this reality and to consider its importance to 
generations of women. Without recognition that abortion serves 
women‘s interest in motherhood, in addition to the other important 
interests it serves, women‘s interests will continue to be 
undervalued in the constitutional equation.  
Like the other constitutional standards—intermediate scrutiny, 
rational basis, rational basis with bite—the strict scrutiny standard 
applied in Roe set up a kind of equation by which the Court weighs 
the individual‘s interest at stake in the protected right on the one 
hand against the state‘s interest in regulation on the other hand.129 
This latter side, the ―tell me why‖ side, as in ―tell me why you get 
to restrict my right,‖ is where most of the analysis is conducted 
under strict scrutiny. The Court asks if the state‘s ―interest‖ in the 
regulation of the right is strong enough to outweigh the 
individual‘s interest in his or her right, and if so, whether and how 
well the regulation actually serves the asserted interest—whether it 
―fits.‖ As the jurisprudence evolved away from strict scrutiny, less 
and less of a ―fit‖ analysis was conducted by the Court. Much of 
this evolution involved a strengthening of the state‘s power to 
regulate on behalf of potential fetal life and a diminishing view of 
the importance of the right to abortion to women. 
A. Women’s Interests in Roe 
On the ―tell me why‖ side in Roe, the Court held that there 
were two ―legitimate and important‖ state interests that could 
sometimes be ―compelling‖ enough to justify restrictions on 
abortion: the state‘s interest ―in preserving and protecting the 
health of the pregnant woman‖ and its interest ―in protecting the 
potentiality of human life.‖130 In weighing the woman‘s interests 
                                               
129 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–63 (1973) (weighing interests). 
130 Id. at 162–63 (Each of the state interests are ―separate and distinct. Each 
grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during 
pregnancy, each becomes ‗compelling.‘‖); see also id. at 162–65 (―[U]ntil the 
end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in 
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against the state‘s justifications, the Court determined that the 
validity of a given restriction on abortion must be evaluated in 
light of the changing nature of pregnancy, its risks and 
complications at different stages as compared to the risks and 
complications of abortion procedures at these different stages, and 
the developmental stages of fertilized egg, embryo, previable and 
finally viable fetus.
131
 Taking these different aspects of pregnancy 
and fetal development into account, the Court announced the 
infamous trimester framework according to which restrictions on 
abortion were to be evaluated.
132
 
The Roe
133
 decision has been criticized for, among other 
things,
134
 its scanty explication of the importance of abortion to 
                                               
normal childbirth‖ and that ―[w]ith respect to the State‘s important and 
legitimate interest in potential life, the ―compelling‖ point is at viability. This is 
so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life 
outside the mother‘s womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability 
thus has both logical and biological justifications.‖).  
131 See, e.g., id. at 162–65 (noting that ―until the end of the first trimester 
mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth‖ and that 
―[w]ith respect to the State‘s important and legitimate interest in potential life, 
the ―compelling‖ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then 
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother‘s womb.  
State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and 
biological justifications.‖). 
132 Under the trimester framework, in the period before the fetus is viable, 
the government could restrict abortion only to serve the state‘s interest in 
protecting women‘s health; after viability however, the government could go so 
far as to prohibit abortion to protect potential life, as long as those laws made 
exceptions to permit abortion when necessary to protect a woman‘s health or 
life. Id. at 162–63. For all the criticism of the trimester framework set out in 
Roe, a trimester system recognized a fact still true thirty-five years later—that 
the level of medical complexity of abortion procedures, the level of risk 
associated with pregnancy, and important facts of fetal development all 
correspond closely with the transitions from trimester to trimester.   
133 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
134 Roe is often criticized, indeed scoffed at, for basing the right to abortion 
on a privacy right found in the ―penumbras‖ and ―shadows‖ of the Bill of 
Rights. However, it was Griswold, not Roe, that relied on a right to privacy 
found in the ―penumbras‖ and ―shadows‖ of the many provisions of the Bill of 
Rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). In Roe, the 
Court cited only the due process liberty right and the Ninth Amendment‘s 
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women‘s liberty135 and explanation of its determination that the 
right to abortion was a ―fundamental‖ one.136 The Roe Court failed 
to discuss the evidence that demonstrated how enforcement 
through law of traditional gender roles in the family created 
                                               
reservation of rights to the people as possible bases for the privacy right, 
abandoning the penumbra argument, though it had been raised by the plaintiffs, 
and instead settling on the liberty right in the end. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Part of 
the confusion about penumbras may have stemmed from the Court‘s use of the 
privacy right as an intermediary between the due process liberty right and the 
right to abortion itself. Perhaps the doctrinal basis for the right would have been 
more readily accepted had the Court adopted Justice Stewart‘s concurring 
analysis, which expounded on the Court‘s decision and advocated that the right 
to abortion should have been grounded directly in the liberty right without the 
intermediary ―right to privacy.‖ Id. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring) (―In a 
Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 
‗liberty‘ must be broad indeed . . . . The Constitution nowhere mentions a 
specific right of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life, but the 
‗liberty‘ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
covers more than those freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of Rights.‖) 
(internal citations omitted). I suspect that the criticism would have flowed in any 
case, but one target of attack would have been removed. Regardless, the 
argument is irrelevant today. In Casey, the Court seems to have followed Justice 
Stewart‘s advice, grounding the right directly in the due process liberty right. 
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851–53 (1992).   
135 In Roe, the Court held that abortion was a ―fundamental‖ right, 410 U.S. 
at 155, protected by the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due 
Process Clause. Id. at 153 (noting that whether the right to privacy is founded in 
the ―Fourteenth Amendment‘s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon 
state action‖ as ―we feel it is‖ or in the Ninth Amendment‘s reservation of rights 
to the people, it is ―broad enough to include abortion‖) (emphasis added).   
136 See, e.g., Reasoning, supra note 9, at 274. (―Because Roe and its 
progeny treat pregnancy as a physiological problem, they obscure the extent to 
which the community that would regulate a woman‘s reproductive choices is in 
fact implicated in them, responsible for defining motherhood in ways that 
impose material deprivations and dignitary injuries on those who perform its 
work.‖); Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due 
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973) (―One of the most 
curious things about Roe is that, behind its own verbal smokescreen, the 
substantive judgment on which it rests is nowhere to be found.‖); id. at 17 
(―[T]he Court never adequately explains [why] ‗the liberty involved is accorded 
a far more stringent protection, so stringent that a desire to preserve the fetus‘s 
existence is unable to overcome it.‘‖) (internal citations omitted). 
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conditions of inequality. It referred to the mental and physical 
harm caused by pregnancy, but failed to detail the ways and the 
frequency with which pregnancy can threaten women‘s health and 
lives. The Court failed to discuss the deaths and injuries caused by 
illegal abortions and the political uprising of thousands of women 
and men, and especially physicians and clergy, who joined the 
movement to secure access to safe abortion in the face of the 
tragedies of the time,
137
 and the Court often referred to the right as 
one belonging to the physician rather than the woman herself.
138
 
However, the language of Roe does support the view that the 
Court recognized that women‘s liberty—or freedom, equality, 
dignity, humanity—depends on their freedom in public and 
freedom in private, at work and at home, as citizen and as mother, 
and recognized that the abortion right was essential to liberty in 
both aspects of women‘s lives. To the extent the Court focused on 
the women obtaining abortions, it recognized that some sought to 
avoid maternity altogether while others sought to create the best 
circumstances for any children to whom they did give birth. In 
recognizing the risk to both physical and mental health posed by 
pregnancy and childcare, the Court noted that ―[m]aternity, or 
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life 
                                               
137 See, e.g., ARLENE CARMEN AND HOWARD MOODY, ABORTION 
COUNSELING AND SOCIAL CHANGE: FROM ILLEGAL ACT TO MEDICAL PRACTICE; 
THE STORY OF THE CLERGY CONSULTATION SERVICE ON ABORTION (Valley 
Forge: Judson Press, 1973); LAURA KAPLAN, THE STORY OF JANE: THE 
LEGENDARY UNDERGROUND FEMINIST ABORTION SERVICE (Univ. Chicago 
Press 1997); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 
(Univ. of Cal. Press 1985). 
138 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (―For the period prior to the point at which the 
state‘s interest in potential life becomes compelling, the attending physician, in 
consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the 
State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient‘s pregnancy should be 
terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an 
abortion free of interference by the State.‖) (emphasis added); id. at 164 (―For 
the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion 
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant 
woman’s attending physician.‖) (emphasis added); id. at 166 (―[T]he abortion 
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and 
basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.‖) (emphasis added). 
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and future,‖ and expressed concern about the woman‘s ability, 
―psychologically and otherwise,‖ to care for a child.139 The Court 
recognized the ―problem of bringing a child into a family already 
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.‖140 In other 
words, the Court acknowledged that women sometimes obtain 
abortions because of their sense of responsibility to care for 
children to whom they ―give‖ birth.   
In recognizing the aspect of abortion that enables women to set 
the terms of their motherhood, the Court was responding to the 
arguments of the political movement for women‘s liberation and 
equality in the background of Roe. As Reva Siegel and Robert Post 
have meticulously detailed, the women‘s movement of the time 
sought women‘s equality in both of the so-called ―separate‖ 
spheres of work and family, demanding legal abortion as one 
required component of the whole. In the ―Women‘s Strike for 
Equality,‖ a one day strike organized by feminists and held on 
August 26, 1970 in approximately forty cities across the country, 
the movement‘s demand for ―Equality Now‖ included demands for 
childcare and abortion, as well as education and employment.
141
 
Part of choosing to decide whether to bear a child, the movement 
recognized, included considering issues related to one‘s family 
                                               
139 Id. at 153. 
140 Id.; see also id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring) (recognizing ―the 
interests of a woman in giving of her physical and emotional self during 
pregnancy and the interests that will be affected throughout her life by the birth 
and raising of a child are of a far greater degree of significance and personal 
intimacy than the right to send a child to private school protected in Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), or the right to teach a foreign language 
protected in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).‖) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
141 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and 
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1988–91 (2003) (arguing that ―for the second-wave 
feminist movement, women‘s emancipation required fundamental changes in the 
structure of family life‖); id. at 1991 (claiming that ―[i]n demanding ‗Equal 
Rights Now‘ in childcare and abortion, as well as in education and employment, 
the strike emphasized that women would no secure equal citizenship with men 
until family life was organized on terms that presupposed the equal participation 
of both its adult members in public life‖).   
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life—how (in the world) that child would be reared if born—as 
well as issues related to one‘s public life—jobs and education.   
Similarly, amicus briefs in Roe argued that women‘s 
constitutional rights were infringed not only when they were 
forced ―to be child breeders,‖ but also when they were forced to be 
child ―rearers against their will,‖142 and when they were forced 
―into the intolerable dilemma of choosing between what in many 
instances would be a totally irresponsible act of bearing and 
casting off‖ or raising an unwanted child.143 The attorneys tied 
women‘s unequal status at home—their disproportionate ―domestic 
responsibilities‖—to their inequality at work.144 They drew a 
connection between the restrictions on the woman caused by 
pregnancy and the restrictions on the woman caused by 
parenting.
145
 Abortion was essential to the adjustment from 
inequality to equality.   
B. Women’s Interests in Casey 
In Casey, the Court‘s view of the interests that the abortion 
right serves shifted, and for the first time the Court explicitly 
acknowledged that abortion serves women‘s interests in equality in 
her public life.
146
 The Court rejected (somewhat grudgingly)
147
 the 
                                               
142 Brief for New Women Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellants at 7, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (emphasis added). 
143 Id. at 13; see also id. at 19.   
144 As one amicus brief put it ―restrictions on a woman‘s liberty and 
property only begin with pregnancy.‖ Id. at 19–20. A woman who had to restrict 
the hours she was available to work outside the home to late afternoon and night 
shifts so that she could care for her children during the day was generally 
considered ―unavailable for work‖ and thus not entitled to unemployment 
compensation. Id. (citing Lukienchuk v. Administrator, Unemp. Comp. Act, 176 
A.2d 892, 23 Conn. Supp. 85 (Super. Ct., 1961)). The brief also noted that the 
only Connecticut case at the time in which the Court held that a woman who 
restricted her availability for ―personal reasons‖ was still entitled to 
unemployment compensation involved a woman who had seven children. Id. 
(quoting Carani v. Danaher, 13 Conn. Supp. 109 (Super. Ct., 1943)). 
145 Id. at 26–27 (arguing that women carry burdens far beyond 
childbearing); id. at 41 (discussing the trauma of giving up a child for adoption). 
146 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (―The ability of 
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State‘s right to impose on the woman ―its own vision of the 
woman‘s role,‖ that is motherhood itself, ―however dominant that 
vision has been in the course of our history and our culture.‖ 
Although this ―equality talk‖ in Casey has been properly lauded, it 
was accompanied by a decrease, not an increase, in the level of 
protection for abortion from strict scrutiny to the undue burden 
standard.   
A clue to this decreasing protection for abortion can be seen in 
the Casey Court‘s fascinating discussion of the woman‘s interest in 
autonomous decision-making that accompanied the equality talk. 
For the first time, the Court expressed real discomfort with the 
decision to have an abortion—discomfort that was behind the 
downgrading of the abortion right and that foreshadows the 
Carhart Court‘s mother-love idolatry and difficulty with abortion 
decision-making expressed in the ―bonds of love‖ paragraph. For 
example, in exploring the woman‘s right to self-determination—
the right to decide whether or not to be a mother—the Court first 
boldly stated that ―[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one‘s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not 
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.‖148 However, while this aspect of the 
abortion decision provided the basis for the Court‘s generous view 
of human fulfillment in Lawrence v. Texas,
149
 in the context of 
abortion it provides the Court little comfort. The Court writes, 
―[t]hese considerations begin our analysis of the woman‘s interest 
                                               
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has 
been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.‖) (citation 
omitted).  
147 I say grudgingly because the only reasons given for not imposing on the 
woman the state‘s vision of her role was that ―[t]he mother who carries a child 
to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she 
must bear.‖ Id. at 852. 
148 Id. at 851. 
149 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (―Freedom extends 
beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes 
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.  The instant 
case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent 
dimensions.‖). 
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in terminating her pregnancy but cannot end it,‖ because 
―[a]bortion is a unique act,‖ an act ―fraught with consequences for 
others,‖ including the woman ―who must live with‖ her decision, 
her ―spouse, family, and society‖ who must live with the 
knowledge that abortions take place, and ―depending on one‘s 
beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted.‖150 Almost 
sorrowfully the Court continues, writing that although ―these 
sacrifices [of childbearing and child rearing] have from the 
beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride 
that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a 
bond of love,‖ this cannot ―alone‖ be grounds for the state to insist 
she make the sacrifice.
151
 In other words, while acknowledging 
that the woman has a right to decide not to be a mother, to decide 
not to make the sacrifice, the Court expresses its wish that the 
woman would make the sacrifice after all and reminds her how 
―ennobled‖ she would be if she were to do so. 
Notably, the Court then continues by exploring aspects of the 
abortion decision-making process that it viewed as ―of the same 
character as the decision to use contraception, to which Griswold v. 
Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Carey v. Population Services 
International afford constitutional protection.‖152 The Court 
recognized that some women choose abortion because of their 
sense of ―responsibility and respect‖ for the life they are creating, 
and because they view ―the inability to provide for the nurture and 
care of the infant [as] a cruelty to the child and an anguish to the 
parent.‖153 These views are ―intimate views with infinite 
variations, and their deep, personal character underlay [the 
Court‘s] decisions in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey. The same 
concerns are present when the woman confronts the reality that, 
perhaps despite her attempts to avoid it, she has become 
pregnant.‖154 The Court was clearly more comfortable with this 
aspect of abortion and has ―no doubt as to the correctness of‖ 
                                               
150 Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.   
151 Id. 
152 Id.   
153 Id. at 853.   
154 Id.  
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Griswold, et al., which ―support the reasoning in Roe relating to 
the woman‘s liberty because they involve personal decisions 
concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also human 
responsibility and respect for it.‖155   
While the Court in Casey recognized, and was much more 
comfortable with, the woman who chose abortion because of her 
sense of ―responsibility and respect‖ for her offspring—her 
concern about nurturing and caring for any child she would 
create—it seems to lose sight of this woman. The decision reads as 
if the woman who chooses abortion is not making a positive choice 
reflecting her sense of responsibility for any life she would create; 
rather, in Casey, the choice is the ―fraught‖ choice. As such, it 
draws from Justice White‘s earlier characterization of the abortion 
right as ―a negative one,‖ the lesser of two evils.156 As Justice 
White saw it, the right in Roe was ―based not on the notion that 
abortion is a good in itself, but only on the view that the legitimate 
goals that may be served by state coercion of private choices 
regarding abortion are, at least under some circumstances, 
outweighed by the damage to individual autonomy and privacy 
that such coercion entails. In other words, the evil of abortion does 
not justify the evil of forbidding it.‖157   
Given what we have learned since Casey, how close the Court 
was at the time to overruling the right to abortion entirely, and how 
hard the right was for Justice Kennedy to stomach,
158
 this 
incorporation of negative views and diminished recognition of the 
positive aspects of abortion is perhaps not surprising. As the 
original members of the Roe majority left the Court and were 
replaced by those who personally opposed abortions, a more 
negative view of the right and the resulting diminished protections 
were perhaps inevitable.   
However, the shift in focus reflected in Casey was also part of 
a larger shift occurring in the pro-choice movement as the 
                                               
155 Id. at 852–53 (emphasis added).   
156 Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 797 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). 
157 Id. 
158 See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN:  HARRY 
BLACKMUN‘S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 182–206 (Henry Holt & Co., 2005).  
SMITH 4/27/2009  7:44 PM 
 RESPONSIBILITY FOR LIFE 137 
movement, and especially the issue of abortion, found itself 
increasingly segregated from other issues of women‘s equality and 
liberation.
159
 To the extent they addressed larger movement issues, 
the briefs of Planned Parenthood and the amici in Casey focused 
on the impact of abortion on women‘s economic equality, the gains 
women had made in the labor force because of their access to 
abortion,
160
 and the importance of abortion to women‘s health.161 
Restrictive abortion laws, they argued, deprived women of basic 
control over their lives—of the freedoms of ―spirit and self-
determination‖—because of the impact of parenthood on a 
woman‘s ability to participate in the marketplace.162 Gone was any 
link of the right to abortion to responsible parenting or to equality 
in family life, and gone was a sense of the importance of equality 
in parenting at home to women‘s equality, liberty, humanity, or 
dignity.   
The briefs do acknowledge that many women who have 
abortions go on to have children. For example, the briefs credit a 
woman‘s ability to control the ―timing and spacing of her children‖ 
with allowing women to ―continue their education, enter the 
workforce and otherwise make meaningful decisions consistent 
                                               
159 Reva Siegel has described how ―[a]s countermobilization against ERA 
and Roe converged, leadership of the women‘s movement struggled to defend 
ERA and Roe by separating them, over time engaging in ever more strenuous 
efforts of self-censorship.‖ Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social 
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 
94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1397 (2006). 
160 See Brief of Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 33–34, n.65, Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (No. 91-744), 1992 WL 12006398 
(noting the increase in women‘s labor force representation and diminution in the 
wage gap between men and women).  
161 See also id. at 31–32 (―Roe’s guarantee of safe, legal abortion has been 
of profound importance to the lives, health, and equality of American women,‖ 
because it ―allowed millions of women to escape the dangers of illegal abortion 
and forced pregnancy,‖ and because ―the nationwide legalization of abortion 
following Roe resulted in dramatic advances in the safety of abortion, and, as a 
consequence, there were substantial decreases in the total number of abortion-
related deaths and complications.‖).  
162 Id. at 26–27 (focusing on parenthood‘s impact on ―a woman‘s 
educational prospects, employment opportunities, and self determination‖). 
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with their own moral choices.‖163 The focus of the briefs can also 
be understood as a product of the time, and can be credited with 
reaching three potentially anti-Roe Justices with arguments about 
the importance of abortion in women‘s lives. But the briefs reflect 
the view that the ultimate prize served by abortion is the freedom 
to be educated and work in conditions of equality, unencumbered 
by one‘s children, and do not discuss the additional ways in which 
abortion serves the goal of gaining the freedom to raise children 
and to mother them in conditions of equality.   
III.  LESSONS FROM GONZALES V. CARHART: A LIMITED BUT 
DANGEROUS DECISION 
In Gonzales v. Carhart,
164
 the Court upheld the federal 
―Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003‖ (―the Act‖), reversing 
course from Stenberg v. Carhart,
165
 a decision issued just seven 
years before. Although I have criticized
166
 the 5 to 4 decision 
                                               
163 Id. at 33 & n.65 (noting that there has been ―a substantial increase in 
women‘s labor force representation and a diminution in the wage gap between 
men and women‖ since Roe). 
164 Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
165 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). In Stenberg, the Court struck 
down a Nebraska law banning so-called ―partial-birth abortion‖ that was nearly 
identical to the later-enacted federal ban. First, the Court held that Nebraska‘s 
law was so broadly worded that it would have banned D&E abortions, which 
account for approximately 90% of all second-trimester abortions, and not just 
intact D&E abortions as Nebraska claimed. Id. at 938–45. Second, the Court 
held that even if the law were narrowly construed to ban only ―intact D&E,‖ the 
ban would be unconstitutional because a ―significant body of medical opinion 
. . . supports the proposition that banning‖ intact D&E ―could endanger 
women‘s health.‖ Id. at 938 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 879 (1992)).  
166 See Postings of Priscilla J. Smith to Balkinization blog, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/search?q=priscilla+Smith+and+carhart (April 26, 
2007, 15:23 EST); id. (May 9, 2007, 12:18 EST), available at 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/search?q=priscilla+Smith+and+carhart; see also 
Posting of Michael Dorf to Dorf on Law blog, http://michaeldorf.org (May 6, 
2007, 00:47 EST); see generally Postings by Jack Balkin to Balkanization blog, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/search?q=Carhart (April 18, 2007); id. (April 19, 
2007); Posting by Marty Lederman to Balkanization blog, http://balkin.blogspot. 
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written by Justice Kennedy as a misapplication and betrayal of 
many of the principles of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
167
 I have 
also argued that there is much in the opinion that reaffirms the 
Casey framework.
168
 Carhart ―eliminates neither the core decision-
making aspect of the right to abortion, nor the rule that a state may 
not restrict access to abortions that are ‗necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.‘‖169 Doctrinally, the language of regret that starts this 
essay is dicta brought on by what the court saw as a ban on one 
gruesome and unnecessary medical procedure that had minimal if 
any safety benefits and thus should have limited impact on future 
cases.
170
 
To view the constitutional standard applied in Carhart this 
way, one must see the opinion from the perspective of the Justice 
in the majority who most limited the decision, presumably Justice 
Kennedy, although potentially Chief Justice Roberts or Justice 
Alito—something many pro-choice attorneys will find difficult. 
From that perspective though, the Court‘s tortured interpretation of 
the statute to ban only intact D&E abortions,
171
 and to leave 
untouched ―the vast majority of D&E abortions,‖172 as the basis for 
its determination that the statute did not have the effect of 
imposing a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion, becomes 
an act that preserves second-trimester abortions. The justifications 
for the Act—those the Court found were weighty enough to allow 
a ban on a narrowly defined set of intact D&E procedures—would 
                                               
com/search?q=Carhart (June 4, 2007, 00:35 EST); Posting by Andrew 
Koppelman to Balkanization blog, http://balkin.blogspot.com/search?q=Carhart 
(Apr. 23, 2007, 18:12 EST); Posting by Mark Graber to Balkanization blog, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/search?q=Carhart (May 4, 2007, 21:12 EST). 
167 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
168 Priscilla J. Smith, Is the Glass Half-Full?: Gonzales v. Carhart and the 
Future of Abortion Jurisprudence, 2 HARV. L. & POL‘Y REV. at 1 (Online) 
(April 9, 2008), http://www.hlpronline.com.    
169 Id. at 1–2. 
170 Id. 
171 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1631 (―[I]nterpreting the Act so that it does not 
prohibit standard D & E is the most reasonable reading and understanding of its 
terms.‖). 
172 Id. at 1632. 
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not have been enough to allow a ban on ―the vast majority of D&E 
abortions.‖173 If we take the Court at its word, that it is protecting 
―standard D&E‖ procedures, Carhart does not impact the 
decisional autonomy strand of the right.
174
 
Similarly, the holding on the constitutional health requirement 
in Carhart is limited to the Court‘s ―determination that there was 
‗uncertainty over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to 
preserve a woman‘s health, given the availability of other abortion 
procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives.‘‖175 Again, 
seeing this as a limited decision requires one to view the holding 
from the Court‘s skeptical perspective. The evidence in Carhart 
may have cracked Justice Kennedy‘s absolute belief, as expressed 
vehemently in dissent in Stenberg,
176
 that the intact D&E would 
never provide anything other than ―minimal‖ health advantages;177 
unfortunately for the plaintiffs, this was not enough for the Court. 
The decision was ―based on what [the Court] saw as a failure of 
proof, rather than an elimination of the underlying rule‖; it ―upheld 
the Act because it held that the Act did not violate the health 
requirement.‖178 
                                               
173 Id.  
174 See Smith, supra note 168, at 8. 
175 Id. at 9 (quoting Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638 (emphasis added)). The 
Court has been rightly taken to task for its conclusion that there was 
―uncertainty‖ over the safety benefits of the intact D&E and its undue crediting 
of congressional ―facts‖ over the testimony of highly credentialed and 
experienced medical experts for the plaintiffs and admissions by government 
witnesses. See, e.g., Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1640 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting); Judith 
Resnik, Courts and Democracy:  The Production and Reproduction of 
Constitutional Conflict, in THE COURTS AND THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 
(The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society 2008), available at 
http://www.fljs.org; Pamela S. Karlan, The Law of Small Numbers: Gonzales v. 
Carhart, Parents Involved in Community Schools, and Some Themes From the 
First Full Term of the Roberts Court, 86 N. Car. L. Rev. 1369, 1381–84 (2008). 
176 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1014–16 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
177 Perhaps this is why the press reported after argument that ―Justice 
Kennedy‘s questioning suggested that he . . . remained open to persuasion.‖ 
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Argument on Late-Term Abortion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at A25. 
178 Smith, supra note 168, at 9; Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1635 (―The 
prohibition in the Act would be unconstitutional, under precedents we here 
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As a doctrinal matter, the key to the different result reached in 
Carhart was the Court‘s reversal of the burden of proof on the 
question of whether a regulation subjects women to health risks. In 
Stenberg, the Court recognized that ―a division of medical 
opinion . . . at most means uncertainty, a factor that signals the 
presence of risk, not its absence.‖179 Where a ―significant body of 
medical opinion believes a procedure may bring with it greater 
safety for some patients and explains the medical reasons 
supporting that view,‖180 the burden of proof lay with the 
government to prove that ―a health exception is ‗never necessary to 
preserve the health of women.‘‖181 But in Carhart suddenly, 
―uncertainty‖—the risk that the woman would be harmed—gave 
the victory to the state, placing the burden on the woman to prove 
harm.
182
  
While the case should have a limited impact on the 
constitutional standard,
183
 the decision is alarming because it 
                                               
assume to be controlling, if it ‗subject[ed] [women] to significant health 
risks.‘‖). 
179 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 937–38 (emphasis added). 
182 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1627. 
183 Subsequent opinions from the Sixth and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal 
support this view of Carhart’s impact. Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits 
carefully applied the Carhart Court‘s limited interpretation of the federal statute 
to a subset of intact D&Es, those that physicians intended to perform at the 
outset of the procedure. The Fourth Circuit, for example, noted that it was 
critical to the Court‘s holding in Carhart that criminal liability does not attach 
where ―a doctor . . . sets out to perform a standard D & E that by accident 
becomes an intact D&E.‖ Richmond Med. Ctr. v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128, 131 
(4th Cir. 2008); see also Northland Family Planning v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 336 
(6th Cir. 2007) (striking Michigan statute applying ―when ‗any anatomical part‘ 
of the fetus passes the vaginal introitus,‖ calling the statute ―sweeping‖ and 
―burdensome‖); id. (noting that ―Gonzales left undisturbed the holding from 
Stenberg that a prohibition on D&E amounts to an undue burden on a woman‘s 
right to terminate her pregnancy.‖). The Fourth Circuit also agreed that the 
Carhart Court did not scrap the health requirement; rather, the failure of the 
plaintiffs‘ health claim was based on a failure of proof. Richmond Med. Ctr., 
527 F.3d at 136 (noting that the Court viewed the issue as a ―contested factual 
question‖) (citing Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638); cf. Northland Family Planning, 
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reveals an increasing discomfort with and distrust of the woman‘s 
decision-making process. Though the Court retains the Casey 
doctrinal framework, its application of the framework is feeble, 
especially in its analysis of whether and how well the ban ―fits‖ the 
asserted interest, and whether the means chosen by the state to 
further the interest in potential life is ―calculated to inform the 
woman‘s free choice, not hinder it.‖184   
The Court‘s claim is that the ban conveys ―knowledge‖ that 
will encourage some women to carry to term, reducing the overall 
number of abortions after the first trimester. The Court appears to 
argue that the ban conveys knowledge because it promotes ―a 
dialogue‖ that will inform ―the political and legal systems, the 
medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of 
the consequences that follow from a decision to elect a late-term 
abortion,‖185 and that that dialogue advances the ―State‘s interest in 
respect for life‖ because it might in fact dissuade some women 
from having second-trimester abortions.
186
 Incredibly, the Court 
confuses the political discourse that accompanied advocacy for and 
against the ban in Congress and in the courts for the discourse 
between patient and medical provider that will occur after the ban 
is upheld. In the Court‘s attempt to shove the ban into the 
―informed consent‖ framework of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, it 
ignores that the ban conveys no ―knowledge‖ to the woman; it fails 
to ―inform‖ her choice as Casey requires, and in fact shuts down 
the dialogue a physician could otherwise have had with the patient 
about how best to perform the abortion to preserve her health.
187
   
In Carhart the aspect of abortion that serves the woman‘s 
interest in the quality of mothering is gone. What is at stake is 
―solely‖ the woman‘s physical safety and her decision not to 
mother—neither of which the Court sees as impacted by the 
federal ban. These interests are now pitted against what the Court 
assumes will be the woman‘s horror if she comes to regret her 
                                               
487 F.3d at 336 (noting ―it is unnecessary for us to address exceptions to an 
unconstitutional and unenforceable general rule.‖).   
184 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).   
185 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
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abortion and then finds out how the abortion was performed.
188
 
Completely lacking here is any sense of the woman making a 
decision informed by her responsibility for mothering.
189
 What is 
left, in the Court‘s view, is a woman who made a bad decision 
about the abortion itself, a decision she will come to regret. She is 
at best uninformed and at worst duped by her physician about what 
the procedure involves. The physician who performs the abortion 
does so not for safety reasons, the Court claims, but for reasons of 
―mere convenience.‖190 Thus, Carhart teaches that the pro-choice 
movement‘s greatest vulnerability lies in the Court‘s view of how 
and why women decide to have abortions. This view reflects the 
idea promoted by anti-abortion activists
191
 that a woman‘s decision 
to have an abortion can only be a result of exploitation by the 
―abortion industry‖ or male predators of her natural weakness,192 
                                               
188 Id. (―It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to 
abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when 
she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know:  that she allowed a 
doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn 
child, a child assuming the human form.‖).  
189 In fact, the Court ignored evidence that removing the fetus intact in an 
intact D&E is often desirable to families, especially those with wanted 
pregnancies obtaining abortions because of fetal indications, because it offered 
them the opportunity to hold their baby and say goodbye and gave the 
physicians the opportunity to obtain evidence concerning the fetal abnormality. 
Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F.Supp.2d 805, 904 (D. Neb. 2004) (quoting testimony 
of Dr. Doe that ―‗these are pregnancies, generally, that were planned and very 
much wanted, and the patient and family are going through a very stressful time 
and frequently want the opportunity to say good-bye to the fetus, to be able to 
hold it and examine it‘‖; noting that Dr. Doe testified that ―many patients 
aborting wanted pregnancies for fetal anomalies wish to see, touch, and hold the 
aborted fetus and cry, and say good-bye; some patients wish to have a burial or 
memorial service‖), rev’d on other grounds sub nom, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 
S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
190 Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638. 
191 Reva Seigel has demonstrated that these depictions of women‘s 
decision-making about abortions are being promoted by the anti-abortion 
movement. See The Politics of Protection, supra note 6, at 992–93.  
192 See Unfair Choice Posters, http://www.unfairchoice.info/posters.htm 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (promoting anti-abortion advertising campaigns with 
posters that include text such as: ―[s]he believed the guy in the letter jacket who 
SMITH 4/27/2009  7:44 PM 
144 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
or of her betrayal of her natural feminine instincts—a betrayal that 
denies women their only real source of love and self-esteem.
193
   
IV.  ―COVERING‖ VS. CONTROLLING MOTHERHOOD 
In the preceding sections, we have seen that many women 
choose abortions because they are concerned about, and feel 
responsible for, how any children they bear will be cared for. By 
giving women the freedom to decide when they will have children, 
abortions allow women more control over the conditions in which 
they care for children they already have or children they will bear 
in the future.
194
 In turn, having the freedom to design the 
conditions in which one‘s children are raised, whether one will be 
sole caretaker, primary caretaker in a couple, secondary caretaker 
in a couple, or whether one will share caretaker duties with a 
partner also allows women to define the kind of mother they will 
be and gives women more control over how they will model 
parenting, and thus gender roles, to their sons and daughters. Thus, 
abortion allows women the freedom to mother their children in 
either traditional or non-traditional ways, and to seek equality in 
their public and in their private lives.   
We have also seen that the understanding that women have 
abortions for these reasons, while more acceptable to the Court 
than the view that women have abortions solely to avoid 
motherhood, has largely receded from the Court‘s consciousness, 
and seems to have lost salience in the pro-choice movement. Three 
questions remain: (1) why has women‘s interest in deciding how to 
                                               
said he loved her . . . and the guy in the white coat who said it‘s just a blob of 
tissue‖; ―he picked up the tab . . . but she‘ll never stop paying for the abortion‖; 
and, with a picture of a broken lamp lying on the ground, ―[l]ike most women 
Mary didn‘t want an abortion . . . but her husband can be very persuasive‖).  
193 See id. (posters including text such as: ―when her baby‘s heart stopped, 
hers stopped too‖; ―you won‘t hear his mother cry, either,‖ with a photo of an 
empty highchair; ―[w]hen she was 17, her mom told her the abortion would only 
hurt for a little while . . . but 40 years, 2 sons and 3 grandkids later, it still hurts,‖ 
with photo of empty baby carriage; and ―21 years ago, Brian withdrew $300 and 
drove his wife to the clinic . . .  [o]ne house, two minivans and three kids later, 
there‘s still no one who can fill these shoes‖, with photo of baby shoes).  
194 See Section I, supra. 
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care for their children been such a minor part of our cultural and 
legal discussion of abortion; (2) how would emphasizing 
motherhood impact efforts to increase protections for the right to 
abortion; and (3) how should this aspect of the right be articulated?   
A. Why We “Cover” Motherhood  
A significant part of the answer to the first question lies in the 
conflicting notions of motherhood in the feminist movement—its 
meanings, its importance, its bonds and its bondage—a debate 
about the dangers of asserting and the dangers of ceding 
motherhood.
195
 Ultimately, in the process of trying to resist old-
fashioned notions of motherhood, some of us have denied the 
importance of motherhood to many women. This version of 
feminist ―covering‖196 threatens to unravel feminism and 
undermine one of its central goals—achieving equality in 
parenting. I see three different conflicts that have led us down this 
path. 
First, some feminists have expressed concern that promoting 
women‘s interests in motherhood in a movement to allow women 
to avoid or control the terms of motherhood is counter-productive. 
                                               
195 Concerns reflected in this debate reflect those in feminist debates over 
―equality-versus-difference‖ approaches to sex inequality. As one scholar 
described, ―both ‗focusing on and ignoring difference risk recreating it.  This is 
the dilemma of difference.‘‖ See Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-
Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, in 
CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 134, 139 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller, eds., 
Routledge, Chapman & Hall 1990) (quoting Martha Minow, Learning to Live 
with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education, 48 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 157, 160 (1984)); see generally Martha Minow, 
Adjudicating Differences: Conflicts Among Feminist Lawyers, in CONFLICTS IN 
FEMINISM 149 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller, eds., Routledge, 
Chapman & Hall 1990) (discussing conflicts between feminists on pregnancy 
and maternity leave policies and on pornography, and noting that these ―fights 
within the movement have been draining and, at times, disturbing‖). 
196 See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002) 
(―Covering means the underlying identity is neither altered nor hidden, but is 
downplayed.  [For example, c]overing occurs when a lesbian both is, and says 
she is, a lesbian, but otherwise makes it easy for others to disattend her 
orientation.‖).   
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They argue that an emphasis on motherhood would support 
essentialist arguments that undermine the rights of women who 
choose not to bear and raise children.
197
 As the movement 
struggled to challenge existing stereotypes of women, advocates 
avoided celebrating notions about the woman‘s role as mother, 
fearing that ―by recognizing the desire to be a mother, one may 
inadvertently strengthen or validate arguments that oppose 
abortion and women‘s claims to control their fertility.‖198  If 
women continue to be lauded, ―ennobled in the eyes of others‖ as 
the plurality put it in Casey, for sacrificing themselves to 
motherhood, women who chose not to be mothers would continue 
to be considered selfish and even evil. Perhaps abortions would be 
allowed for women who choose abortion because of their concerns 
for their future children, but not for those who choose abortion 
because they want no part of motherhood.   
These are not trivial concerns. Anti-abortion advocates have 
used traditional notions of motherhood successfully to restrict 
abortion. For example, a South Dakota law already forces 
physicians to tell a woman seeking an abortion that, among other 
things, a pregnant woman has an ―existing relationship‖ with the 
―unborn human being‖ which ―enjoys protection under the United 
States Constitution and under the laws of South Dakota‖ and that 
                                               
197 See generally Pamela Karlan and Daniel Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: 
Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 NW. 
U. L. REV. 858, 871 (1993) (discussing debate).   
198 Carol Sanger, M is for Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN‘S 
STUD. 15, 24 (1992). For example, while calling for feminists to ―acknowledg[e] 
and [fully describe] the substantial room that motherhood takes up in women‘s 
lives,‖ Carol Sanger describes dangers in the use of ―motherhood‖ imagery. 
Motherhood, ―despite its capacity to overwhelm, [should] not be mistaken for 
the whole show.‖ Id. at 31 (arguing that ―attempts at distilling all women into 
mothers and all mothers into good ones are bound to be unreliable‖). Stories 
about ―good‖ mothers, she pointed out, raise traditional notions of selfless 
beings and cast those rejecting this traditional role in opposition, ―as wicked 
creatures, usually characterized by some version of selfishness.‖ Id. at 36; see 
also id. at 20–21 (describing avoidance of motherhood in curricula and 
scholarship and arguing that ― [t]he identification of motherhood as a source of 
subordination led early feminists to direct their energies toward creating social 
structures less encumbered by maternal obligation‖).  
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―by having an abortion, her existing relationship and her existing 
constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be 
terminated.‖199 However, it is exactly the success of this anti-
abortion advocacy that demonstrates the cost of ceding discussions 
of motherhood. Rather than preventing anti-abortion advocates 
from using gender stereotypes against us, our failure to counter 
anti-abortion advocates‘ images of motherhood has allowed them 
to define the relationship between abortion and motherhood, and 
indeed to define motherhood itself, in their image and not ours.
200
 
Second, by avoiding an emphasis on women‘s interest in 
motherhood, movement advocates avoid aggravating numerous 
conflicts in our movement over the concept of motherhood. 
Women seeking liberation and equality for the female gender are 
not a uniform lot.
201
 There are those on whom motherhood has 
been thrust and those whose motherhood has historically been 
disparaged, discouraged, and often denied.
202
 There are those who 
                                               
199 H.B. 1166, codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2008); 
Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of 
Physician Compelled Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939 (describing statute); see 
also Sanger, supra note 198, at 36–37 (describing how mothers‘ interests were 
―recast from noble to selfish,‖ in debates in the late 1980s over federal Family 
and Medical Leave legislation). 
200 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007) (―While we find 
no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to 
conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they 
once created and sustained.  Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.); 
REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION (2005) 
(espousing view later expressed by the Supreme Court in Carhart), available at 
http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/Task_Force_Report.pdf; see also H.B. 
1233, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005) (describing creation of legislative task 
force to study and report on abortion). 
201 See generally Teresa Lauretis, Upping the Anti (sic) in Feminist Theory, 
in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 255 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller, eds., 
Routledge, Chapman & Hall 1990). 
202 See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (challenge 
to public hospital‘s policy of secretly searching urine of pregnant women for 
cocaine use and reporting positive results to law enforcement); Kimani Paul-
Emile, The Charleston Policy: Substance or Abuse? 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 325 
(1999); Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of 
Color, Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991). 
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embrace and celebrate themselves as ―not-mother,‖ and those that 
embrace the role of mother with a gooey selflessness.
203
 There are 
women who have sex with men, women who have sex with 
women, and women who have sex with men and women.  There 
are feminists and there are ―womanists.‖204 There are womanists 
who are also feminists and vice versa. There are women who are 
not mothers and women who mother children they did not bear 
themselves who must struggle to forge a new identity from the 
―barren spinster‖ role that was assigned them in the past. And there 
are those who enjoy privilege as the ―good mother.‖ There are 
women from communities where women have always ―balanced‖ 
or juggled work and family; there are others for whom balancing 
work and family is a new challenge. And there is everyone in 
between.
205
   
Some of these conflicts between conceptions of motherhood 
play out in debates in the feminist movement over public policy. 
For example, feminists argue about whether seeking benefits and 
accommodations for caregiving will result in a regressive view of 
women‘s roles or whether it is necessary if ―we want to improve 
the situation of real women living in the real world, often in 
poverty with real children.‖206   
                                               
203 I confess that I have found myself in each category and between at 
different times in my life.   
204 See ALICE WALKER, IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS‘ GARDENS: 
WOMANIST PROSE (Harcourt Brace & Co. 2004). The concept of a ―womanist‖ 
was presented in Walker‘s In Search of Our Mother’s Gardens, and, as the 
theologian Delores Williams noted, many other women have ―appropriated it as 
a way of affirming themselves as black while simultaneously owning their 
connection with feminism and with the Afro-American community, male and 
female. The concept of womanist allows women to claim their roots in black 
history, religion and culture.‖ Delores Williams, Womanist Theology: Black 
Women’s Voices, CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS (March 2, 1987), available at 
http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=445. 
205 See generally Minow, Adjudicating Differences, supra note 195, at 160 
(―If feminists seek to challenge institutions that were designed without women 
in mind, and social practices that subordinate women, the construction of a 
feminist agenda must address all women.‖).  
206 Mary Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI. KENT L. 
REV. 1495, 1539 (2001) (citing Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance 
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In some quarters, there is an intergenerational conflict over 
motherhood, similar to that described by Robin West between 
traditionalist anti-Equal Rights Amendment women and those she 
calls ―their ERA besotted daughters.‖207 This conflict plays out 
between the ―ERA besotted‖ ones—second-wave feminists, those 
from the movement taking place in the 1960s-70s—and their 
daughters, some of whom consider themselves ―third-wave‖ 
feminists.
208
 Some ―third wavers‖ extol the pleasures of 
motherhood, sometimes in reaction to a real or perceived 
denigration of motherhood by none other than their own 
mothers.
209
 Just as the ERA-besotted daughter ―define[d] herself 
not just as ‗not you,‘ but against and in negation of her traditional 
mother,‖210 so the third-waver feels her own mother‘s rejection of 
motherhood as a rejection of herself. In an attempt not to repeat 
                                               
to Domesticity: Care as Work, Gender as Tradition, 76 CHI. DENT L. REV. 1441, 
1454–57 (2001)). Compare Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on 
Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183 (2001) 
(―contend[ing] that first and second wave legal feminists who argued that 
―women‘s participation in the wage labor market be compatible with our 
responsibilities as mothers . . . tend[ed] to collapse women‘s identity into 
motherhood‖); id. (arguing that ―issues of gender collapse quite quickly into the 
normative significance of our roles as mothers‖ and that feminists should not 
start with the ―centrality, presumption and inevitability of our responsibility for 
children‖); id. at 197 (arguing that ―feminists must not ―abandon a concern for 
the role of reproduction and mothering in women‘s lives‖), with Becker, supra, 
at 1529 (calling Franke‘s argument simply ―nonsense.‖); id. at 1535 (arguing 
that ―if most women are mothers, feminists should be pushing for changes to 
improve the lives of women who are mothers,‖ which will require support for 
the care movement).  
207 Robin West, Constitutional Culture or Ordinary Politics: A Reply to 
Reva Siegel, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (2006). 
208 See, e.g., Third Wave Foundation, http://www.thirdwavefoundation.org/ 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008).   
209 REBECCA WALKER, BABY LOVE:  CHOOSING MOTHERHOOD AFTER A 
LIFETIME OF AMBIVALENCE 8–9 (Riverhead Books 2007) (―[When I found out I 
was pregnant,] I didn‘t know that the showdown between the ideas of my 
mother‘s generation and my own was inescapable, and slated to play out 
personally in our relationship. I didn‘t know that those fifteen years [that I had 
been wanting a baby] constituted my real first trimester, and all that time my 
baby was coming toward me, and I was moving toward my baby.‖).  
210 West, supra note 207, at 1470. 
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this cycle of rejection in relation to her own offspring, she 
embraces the role of mother and defines herself against her own 
mother. The third-waver rejects stereotypes of motherhood and 
believes she can find a way to embrace motherhood while asserting 
and maintaining her own liberty and equality.
211
 Her mother might 
experience the daughter‘s embracing of motherhood as a rejection 
of her own reasons (or excuses, depending on one‘s generational 
point of view) for her unhappiness as mother and accuses the 
daughter of being ungrateful. She also fears the daughter is naïve 
and will lose everything feminists of the 1970s-80s have worked 
for.
212
   
Third, some, particularly Robin West, have argued that the 
theoretical paradigms adopted in the Court‘s abortion 
jurisprudence, and thus used by legal advocates to protect the right, 
have themselves discouraged discussion of women‘s interests in 
motherhood. As Professor West argued, the ―insularity of the 
decision to abort accorded by the liberal notion of ‗right,‘ . . . 
obfuscates the moral quality of most abortion decisions.‖213 There 
                                               
211 A most dramatic example of this conflict can be found in the very public 
exchanges between ―third-wave‖ feminist Rebecca Walker and her mother, the 
famous writer and activist Alice Walker, described by Rebecca in her book and 
articles. See BABY LOVE:  CHOOSING MOTHERHOOD AFTER A LIFETIME OF 
AMBIVALENCE, supra note 175; Rebecca Walker, How my mother’s fanatical 
views tore us apart, (May 23, 2008), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
femail/article-1021293/How-mothers-fanatical-feminist-views-tore-apart-
daughter-The-Color-Purple-author.html; Rebecca Walker, Feminist Infighting 
(March 1, 2008), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rebecca-
walker/feminist-infighting_b_89339.html. 
212 See Jessica Valenti, The Sisterhood Split, THE NATION (March 6, 2008), 
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080324/valenti; Bridget Crawford, 
Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and 
the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99, 167 (2007) (―Third-wave 
feminism is largely a reactive critique that fails to advance its own positivistic 
view of how its goals should be accomplished . . . . Third-wave feminists 
respond to incomplete and distorted images of second-wave feminism. Their 
indictment of second-wave feminism has led to a significant tension between 
older and younger feminists, and division among young feminists themselves.‖). 
213 Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 81 
(1990). Similarly, Carol Sanger argued that ―because the right to abortion 
developed within a framework of privacy that focused on a woman‘s right to 
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are dangers in ―[c]eding motherhood . . . as an experience, a 
symbol, and a virtue to the anti-abortion camp,‖ she argues; ―[b]y 
insisting that the ‗right‘ to an abortion, like all rights, is not 
contingent on the morality of the right-holder or the moral quality 
of the conduct the right protects,‖ we may ―inadvertently 
bolster . . . the pernicious and false claims that the decision to abort 
is more often than not based on nothing more than a woman‘s 
‗convenience.‘‖214  
Indeed, one could see Carhart as the inevitable result of 
protection of the right to abortion as a right that ―insulates both the 
right-holder and the act that the right protects from the 
community‘s scrutiny, judgment and understanding.‖215 While the 
anti-abortion community has worked hard
216
 to fill the moral 
vacuum, we have been almost precluded from doing so by our 
doctrine.
217
 The moral vacuum was then filled in by the dominant 
culture, which in our case is one that does not believe that pregnant 
women are equal to non-pregnant persons,
218
 and promotes the 
                                               
control her trimestered body,‖ attention was diverted away from a ―woman‘s 
interest in controlling her post-pregnant, child-now-out-of-body life.‖ As 
abortion became a reproductive rather than a maternal issue, the very idea of 
motherhood became antithetical to a prochoice position instead of its essence. 
Sanger, supra note 198, at 23. 
214 West, supra note 213, at 81–82; see also Sanger, supra note 198, at 23–
24 (arguing that ceding motherhood ―has had consequences for how we explore 
(or do not explore) other issues relating to mothers‖).   
215 West, supra note 213, at 81. 
216 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY 
ABORTION (2005) (arguing that abortion harms women physically and mentally 
by, inter alia, depriving them of their ―constitutionally protected‖ relationship 
with the ―unborn child‖), available at http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/Task 
_Force_Report.pdf.   
217 In one district court oral argument, as I began to explain reasons women 
obtain abortions in the second trimester, the judge politely stopped me and said, 
―that is none of my business.‖ His job was not to question why, but to determine 
whether the state had any business interfering.   
218 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (―The 
[challenged insurance] program divides potential recipients into two groups-
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively 
female, the second includes members of both sexes.‖). But see Reva Siegel, 
You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy 
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idea that the decision to abort is based only on a woman‘s 
convenience.   
On the other hand, as West allows, the alternative of resting 
reproductive freedom ―on the demonstrated capacity of pregnant 
women to decide whether to carry a fetus to term or to abort 
responsibly,‖ would allow the dominant culture‘s view of women 
to control just as readily, if not more so, than in a rights mode. 
Such a ―responsible woman‖ standard invites scrutiny of each 
woman‘s decision for compliance with some sort of responsibility-
based moral code
219
 which, in the current world, is likely to be 
―badly tainted‖ by bias of misogynist and racist perceptions of 
women.
220
 Indeed, one could also read Carhart as foreshadowing 
the result of resting reproductive freedom on the majority‘s view of 
women‘s ―moral responsibility.‖ What would the result have been, 
after all, if there was no ―right‖ at all? Either the statute would 
have gone into effect without any limiting construction and doctors 
would have been unable to provide second-trimester abortions at 
all or, in the perfect world newly informed by arguments about 
women‘s moral reasoning, the statute would never have been 
enacted in the first place.   
B. Emphasizing the Aspects of Abortion that Serve Motherhood 
Resuscitating and emphasizing the argument that abortion 
serves women‘s interest in motherhood has at least two 
                                               
Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1873–74 (2006) (arguing that 
―Hibbs is the first Supreme Court opinion to recognize that laws regulating 
pregnant women can enforce unconstitutional sex stereotypes, and so introduces 
an important new understanding of when discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy is discrimination on the basis of sex under Geduldig v. Aeillo.‖); id. at 
1873 (―I am prepared to treat Rehnquist‘s change in perspective as the 
nation‘s.‖); Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 
(2003). 
219 I can imagine, for example, the imposition of a kind of judicial bypass 
procedure for adult women, where judges would decide whether the woman‘s 
decision was responsible ―enough.‖ 
220 West, supra note 213, at 83; see also Pamela Karlan & Daniel Ortiz, In 
a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal 
Agenda, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 858, 871 (1993).  
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advantages. First, not only should this emphasis increase the 
weight of the woman‘s interest in abortion as against the state‘s 
interest in limiting it in the constitutional equation, it also provides 
additional arguments for the protection of the right itself. I discuss 
this more in the section that follows.
221
 
Second, stressing this argument should increase public support 
for and understanding of abortion. In making this argument, I 
respond to Robin West‘s call for ―Liberals and feminists [to] 
develop alternative, public-regarding arguments supporting 
[reproductive rights] and the liberty they protect that transcend the 
circular and increasingly false insistence that they simply exist.‖222 
Given the high percentage of women who have an abortion in their 
lifetimes or who are close to a woman who has an abortion, this 
aspect of the abortion decision-making process is likely to resonate 
with women in the United States, and stressing it will make 
abortion patients more recognizable to themselves and to the 
public. In fact, it is likely that one reason many women do not see 
themselves in the public image of an abortion patient is because 
women obtaining abortions are not portrayed in a way that they 
recognize.
223
 
Moreover, this argument may be comforting to those who, like 
Justice Kennedy, still hold on to some old-fashioned notions of 
pregnancy, motherhood, and gender roles. As David Cohen has 
demonstrated, Justice Kennedy‘s jurisprudence in cases addressing 
―the parent-child relationship‖ relies on ―traditional and 
paternalistic gender stereotypes about nontraditional fathers, [and] 
idealized mothers.‖224 At least as long as Justice Kennedy remains 
                                               
221 See infra at Section IV.C. 
222 See West, supra note 213, at 84. 
223 Perhaps this is why, as has been reported by many an abortion provider, 
so many patients can say, ―I believe abortion is murder, but in my case, it‘s 
different.‖ See e.g., WICKLUND, supra note 24, at 178–84; Cornelia Dean, 
Telling the Stories Behind the Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov 6, 2007, at F5. 
Women are making the decision themselves for reasons they view as 
responsible, caring reasons about children they would otherwise bear, reasons 
that are different from the reasons they are told others obtain abortions.   
224 David Cohen, Justice Kennedy’s Gendered World, 59 S.C. L. REV. 673, 
688–90 (2008) (evaluating Justice Kennedy‘s votes and opinions in sex-
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at the Court‘s center, pro-choice advocates should demonstrate 
how abortion serves both the women‘s interest in the importance of 
motherhood, and in how she will care for any child she would 
otherwise bear, as well as the woman‘s interest in whether she will 
bear a child at all. By making these arguments, pro-choice 
advocates will not appeal to those who believe that motherhood is 
women‘s only true calling.225  However, they will appeal to those 
who believe that women should be able to seek fulfillment outside 
the home, who accept that abortion is necessary, but who are 
comforted by the reality that many women still view caring for 
children as an integral part of their lives.   
C. Articulating How Abortion Serves Motherhood in a Rights 
Framework  
The final question then is whether we can reflect the realities of 
women seeking abortions in a way that reveals the moral quality of 
their decisions and appeals to a sense of ―responsibility,‖ but 
continue to make our arguments in a rights-based model, be it a 
liberty, privacy, equality, dignity or human right. I reject the idea 
that a rights-based model and a model infused with notions of 
responsibility are mutually exclusive; after all, we already have a 
rights-based model infused with notions of irresponsibility. It 
seems entirely reasonable to articulate that the rights of liberty and 
equality do not just mean freedom from family but also freedom in 
family, and to chart abortion‘s role in family as well as in avoiding 
                                               
discrimination cases and arguing that in those ―sex-discrimination cases 
involving the parent-child relationship, Justice Kennedy relies on traditional and 
paternalistic gender stereotypes about nontraditional fathers, idealized mothers, 
and second-guessing women‘s decisions‖).  
225 See, e.g., Allan Carlson, Paul Mero, The Natural Family: A Manifesto, 
in 19 THE FAMILY IN AMERICA 1 (March 2005) (―[W]omen and men are equal in 
dignity and innate human rights, but different in function. Even if sometimes 
thwarted by events beyond the individual‘s control (or sometimes given up for a 
religious vocation), the calling of each boy is to become husband and father; the 
calling of each girl is to become wife and mother.‖); see also Reva Siegel, The 
New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion 
Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1002–06 (2007) (hereinafter ―New 
Politics”) (summarizing the manifesto and describing its origins). 
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family. We are, after all, in the lucky position of telling the truth 
about abortion. 
Framing women‘s decisions to obtain abortions in reference to 
their views of the importance of motherhood in both litigation and 
in legislative advocacy does this, and should do it without pitting 
one woman against another, as long as the decisions of women 
who choose abortions in all different circumstances are 
described—the decisions of women who are mothers, women who 
want to be mothers at some point but not now, and also those who 
do not want to be mothers at all, and whose ―life‘s work‖226 is 
located elsewhere entirely.   
Appealing to concerns for motherhood will strengthen the right 
to abortion by adding the woman‘s right to control how she will 
parent to the list of aspects of our rights to liberty and equality that 
abortion serves.
227
 Abortion in this view is a positive and essential 
means for the creation of a happy citizenry, a tool which along 
with contraception helps women protect their health and lives, 
control their own futures, and, when they choose to raise children, 
to raise them in the best circumstances they can. This aspect of the 
right to abortion, the aspect that serves women‘s interest in 
motherhood, should be protected by the right to control how one‘s 
children are raised, a right clearly embraced by the Court as a 
liberty right.
228
   
Moreover, placing women‘s control over motherhood front and 
center in our demand for abortion should also strengthen a right to 
abortion based in the right to equal protection of the laws. As 
others have argued,
229
 abortion restrictions that enforce, or are 
                                               
226 See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1888 (2000) 
(developing a vision of social justice). 
227 See supra notes 6–8. 
228 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (enforcing 
due process liberty right of parents ―to direct the upbringing and education of 
[their] children‖); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (due process 
liberty guarantee includes right to ―establish a home and bring up children‖). 
229 As Reva Siegel has argued, under Casey the courts should examine a 
state‘s interest in a given regulation to insure that it is not merely a guise 
through which to enforce the ―state‘s vision of the woman‘s role.‖ See Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992); see also Siegel, Sex Equality, 
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justified by reference to, gender stereotyped notions of motherhood 
violate notions of sex equality under either the equal protection 
clause,
230
 the equal right to liberty recognized in Thornburgh,
231
 or 
Casey’s rejection of the State‘s right to insist ―upon its own vision 
of the woman‘s role, however dominant that vision has been in the 
course of our history and culture.‖232 While many have argued that 
an equality analysis provides a stronger doctrinal basis for the right 
to abortion than the privacy right grounded in liberty in Roe,
233
 and 
although such an analysis has already seeped into abortion 
jurisprudence, the availability of the doctrine has done nothing to 
increase protections yet. Rather than following Casey, the Court 
turned its back on Casey’s admonition that the state cannot insist 
―upon its own vision of the woman‘s role,‖ and ignored Casey’s 
improper purpose rule which demanded more of an analysis of the 
                                               
supra  note 9, at 815–16 (―Whatever sex role differences in intimate and family 
relations custom may engender, government may not entrench or aggravate 
these role differences by using law to restrict women‘s bodily autonomy and life 
opportunities in virtue of their sexual or parenting relations in ways that 
government does not restrict men‘s.‖); id. at 823–24 (noting that this argument 
was presented by amici in Roe). 
230 See, e.g., New Politics, supra note 225, at 991–92 (―argu[ing] that the 
equal protection cases that prohibit state action enforcing sex stereotypes 
prohibit laws enforcing [stereotyped views of] motherhood.‖); Siegel, Sex 
Equality, supra note 12, at 816 (describing sources claiming doctrinal support 
for reproductive rights in the 14th Amendment‘s due process clause, the equal 
protection clause, privileges and immunities and the 13th and 19th 
Amendments). 
231 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (noting that the promise of liberty is extended to ―women 
as well as to men‖); id. (acknowledging that the central sphere of liberty is 
―guarantee[d] equally to all.‖); see also Siegel, Sex Equality, supra note 9, at 
831–32 (discussing Court‘s development of an equality analysis in the liberty 
right); id. at 831–34 (discussing Tuscon Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 
548 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
232 Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. See also Siegel, Sex Equality, supra note 9, at 
834 (―Courts can enforce equal citizenship values by evaluating restrictions on 
reproductive decision making to ensure that such restrictions do not reflect or 
enforce gender stereotypes about women‘s agency or their sexual and family 
roles.‖). 
233 Id.  
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potentially discriminatory motives behind state regulations. The 
Carhart Court actually relied on a rationale that resuscitates 
gender-stereotyped notions of women‘s role in the family and a 
paternalistic view of the necessity of abortion regulation,
234
 an 
unconstitutional rationale whose purpose is to impose a burden on 
women that is undue.
235
 
In fact, the way that sex equality notions have been ushered 
into abortion jurisprudence with an emphasis on equality in the 
labor force
236
 has focused the Court on a decision it is 
uncomfortable with—a decision to have an abortion so one can be 
equal in the workplace. As Reva Siegel warned in 1992:  
So long as accounts of the abortion decision exempt men 
and society at large from their responsibility for shaping the 
conditions under which women conceive, bear, and rear 
children, it is only the woman seeking an abortion who 
appears to attach negative value to pregnancy. In these 
circumstances, her decision to seek an abortion will appear 
to reflect traits of the feminine character—be it frail, 
overwrought, selfish, or capricious.
237
  
When the decision is so ―fraught‖ and potentially faulty, the Court 
is likely to tolerate more ―burden‖ on the woman than it would 
tolerate on men.   
This may be just another way of saying that the equality 
argument will not prevail until the Court views pregnant women as 
                                               
234 Interestingly, the argument that intact D&E procedures were harmful to 
women was not made by the government in the course of litigation. See 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007). 
235 See Siegel, New Politics, supra note 225, at 999 (“If separate spheres 
views of women‘s roles played a motivating part in the enactment of abortion 
restrictions, the abortion restrictions violate‖ equality guarantees.); id. at 1040–
43. 
236 In Casey, the Court finally explicitly acknowledged that abortion serves 
women‘s interests in achieving social and economic equality, pronouncing that 
―[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of 
the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive 
lives.‖ 505 U.S. at 856 (citation omitted). 
237 Siegal, Reasoning, supra note 9, at 274 n.49.  
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truly equal.
238
 Where the Court views the pregnant woman‘s 
―bonds of love‖ for her child as an ultimate expression of respect 
for human life, an argument that the Constitution protects a 
pregnant woman‘s liberty to reject this relationship, or her equality 
right not to have the relationship foisted upon her, will be viewed 
with skepticism, confusion, pity, and ultimately a desire to protect, 
as it was in Carhart. The Court‘s approach to these cases, unless 
the woman is the most sympathetic—a rape or incest victim 
perhaps, or a woman whose condition is life threatening beyond a 
shadow of a doubt thus rendering her decision more apparently 
sound
239—will likely remain the same, employing a shoddy ―fit‖ 
analysis if it applies one at all. A claim, even one revealing that a 
given restriction was designed to impose traditional stereotyped 
roles on women, will not prevail without or a radical change in our 
cultural views of gender roles,
240
 or a different focus to the equality 
argument such as that I am proposing here, no matter whether 
grounded in liberty, equal protection, dignity, human rights, or 
                                               
238 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (―The [challenged 
insurance] program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women 
and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second 
includes members of both sexes.‖); see also, e.g., Reasoning, supra note 9, at 
275 (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 and arguing that Court would 
continue to see the pregnant woman as ―inherently different‖ from Geduldig’s 
―nonpregnant persons‖ as long as it considered the pregnant woman ―from what 
it conceives to be a strictly physiological standpoint.‖); id. at 277 (Abortion-
restrictive regulation is sex-based regulation, the use of public power to force 
women to bear children. Yet, the Court has never described the state‘s interest in 
protecting potential life as an interest in forcing women to bear children.‖). 
239 Cf. Amy Goldstein, Ailing Woman Becomes Abortion Symbol:  Both 
Sides Take up the Case of Michelle Lee, Whose Heart Problems Make 
Pregnancy Dangerous, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE Oct. 25, 1998, at A11 
(reporting that doctors in a Louisiana public hospital where abortions are 
allowed only where pregnancy is life-threatening, denied abortion to pregnant 
woman with serious heart condition whose chance of dying was not greater than 
50 percent). 
240 See Siegel, Reasoning, supra note 9, at 360 (―Although the separate 
spheres tradition no longer receives official public sanction, the sex-role 
concepts it fostered continue to play a crucial part in the abortion controversy, 
supplying norms of sexual and maternal comportment for women that inform 
public judgments about the propriety of abortion.‖). 
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even the Ninth Amendment.
241
   
Finally, the Court should also protect the right as a hybrid 
equal right of liberty based on its holdings in Meyer and Pierce on 
the one hand
242
 and Eisenstadt v. Baird
243
 on the other. As Kim 
Buchanan has argued with respect to one‘s right to sexual liberty, 
men and women have ―equal due process interests in deciding how 
to‖ control the raising of their children;244 Eisenstadt stands for the 
proposition that ―whatever the scope and nature‖ of the due 
process liberty right to raise one‘s children, ―equal protection 
requires that women must enjoy it equally with men.‖245 
Restrictions on abortion that prevent women from controlling these 
conditions are therefore unconstitutional for this reason as well.  
CONCLUSION 
Carhart marks an important moment for the movement not just 
for access to abortion, but also for women‘s liberation generally. 
                                               
241 Many scholars have argued that the right to abortion, again like the 
rights of gay men and lesbians, should be articulated as some version of a 
―hybrid‖ constitutional right—one that connects our Constitution‘s liberty and 
equality values. See citations in note 9 supra. Reva Siegel has carried the 
analysis further within the reproductive rights arena both by revealing the 
existence of a hybrid analysis already employed by the Court to recognize 
constitutional protections for notions of ―dignity‖ that included both liberty and 
equality elements, and applying that dignity framework to a review of the dicta 
in Carhart used to justify the regulations approved in that case. Siegel, The 
Politics of Protection, supra note 6. 
242 See supra note 161. 
243 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
244 Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s 
Sexuality, 56 EMORY L.J. 1235, 1238, 1294-1302 (2007); see also Sex Equality, 
supra note 9, at 831–32 (discussing Court‘s development of an equality analysis 
in the liberty right); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (declaring that: (1) 
the Constitution promises an equal guarantee of liberty to ―women as well as 
men‖ and (2) the woman‘s decision whether to end her pregnancy is among the 
most ―basic to individual dignity and autonomy‖ of all the decisions protected 
by this equal right to liberty and thus is ―fundamental.‖).  
245 Id. at 1237 & n.11 (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (―[W]hatever the 
rights of the individual to access contraceptives may be, the rights must be the 
same for the unmarried and the married alike.‖)). 
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Since Roe, the sense that abortion serves women‘s interests in 
liberty and equality in the family, as well as in civic life, has been 
decreasing. The Carhart Court‘s decision has finally turned 
motherhood against us explicitly, and speaks about our ―bonds of 
love‖ as if we needed to be reminded of them, as if in straying so 
far from home we have lost touch with love itself. This insult lays 
down the gauntlet. It is time we respond to take up the challenge, 
to reclaim motherhood in our own image. Emphasizing that 
abortion serves women‘s interest in motherhood will benefit the 
movement for reproductive freedom whether our courts become 
more liberal or more conservative, and will promote a fuller 
understanding of the role abortion plays in women‘s lives. 
The question is whether we are strong enough as a movement 
to protect our right to celebrate maternity without regressing into 
―maternal essentialism,‖ that is, ―the belief that the real, true 
‗whatness‘ of women is motherhood.‖246 Can we do this without 
giving up our right to decide how to use our ―generative 
potential,‖247 and while claiming our right to decide this in part on 
behalf of our own children‘s wellbeing? The women who rely on 
abortion or the possibility of obtaining an abortion deserve to be 
described by us in a way that is recognizable to them. If we do not 
take up this challenge, I fear they will no longer be able to rely on 
the right at all.   
 
                                               
246 Sanger, supra note 198, at 19. 
247 Robert Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman’s Decision-
Making Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787, 880 (1996). 
